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INTRODUCTION
Everyone agrees that Erie Railroad v. Tompkins is an important case.1
And at a high level of generality, everyone also agrees on what the case
stands for: federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction apply federal
procedure but state substantive law.2 Dig any deeper than that, though, and
the agreement dissolves.3
In fact, Erie analysis is notorious for the puzzles it has produced. Does
the case have any import for state courts? What happens when a federal
court transfers a case to a district in another state? How should federal
common law created to fill gaps in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
interact with state law deemed substantive for Erie purposes? Does the
Constitution require federal courts to follow state choice-of-law rules? Or
might they have the power to modify such rules in the context of a class
action?

1

304 U.S. 64 (1938). See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 55, at 378 (6th ed. 2002) (“It is impossible to overstate the importance of the Erie decision.”); Craig
Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 595 (2008) (describing Erie as one of the
“cultural pillars of our legal architecture”).
2
See, e.g., Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The Revolution of 1938 and Its Discontents,
61 OKLA. L. REV. 275, 276 (2008) (offering this characterization); Amanda R. Szuch, Comment,
Reconsidering Contractual Waivers of the Right to a Jury Trial in Federal Court, 79 U. CIN. L. REV.
435, 442–43 (2010) (same).
3
See, e.g., Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 427, 427 (1958)
(noting “extraordinary confusion” surrounding Erie).
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The Supreme Court has offered answers to some of these questions,4
but the Justices have usually differed amongst themselves, and their work
has received mixed reviews.5 My aim in this Article is to provide a better
way of thinking about the Erie problem.
That better way is a conceptual framework developed in the choice-oflaw context, what I will call the “two-step model.” It is appropriate for Erie
analysis because, I will argue, Erie is in fact best understood as a choice-oflaw case. Part I of this Article will present that argument by engaging in a
close reading of Erie to show that its conceptual structure is the same as
that of the classic choice-of-law problem. Parts II and III then demonstrate
that the understanding of Erie achieved by viewing it through the two-step
model gives us new insight into some difficult problems, both classic Erie
puzzles and more recent choice-of-law conundrums.
But solving those problems is not my sole or final goal. I have argued
in other publications that this model is the correct way to conceptualize
choice-of-law problems, but it is by no means universally accepted in that
context.6 I hope that its success in resolving some of these problems will
serve as an advertisement for its use in choice of law more generally. I hope
to show, that is, that Erie is fundamentally a choice-of-law case, that we can
deal with the problems it creates by using the two-step model, and that the
model’s success suggests that it is indeed the correct way to think about
choice of law.
I.

ERIE

A. The Lower Courts and the General Law
One dark night, Pennsylvania resident Harry Tompkins was walking
alongside the tracks of the Erie Railroad in Hughestown, Pennsylvania
when he was struck and knocked down by an object—probably the
swinging door of a refrigerator car—protruding from a passing train.7 As he

4

See, e.g., Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding that federal
courts exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply state choice-of-law rules); Ferens v. John Deere Co.,
494 U.S. 516, 519 (1990) (holding that interdistrict transfer should not affect choice of law).
5
See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., ot Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the
Supreme Court Is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 963 (1998).
6
See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by Means
of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1821, 1861–64 (2005) [hereinafter Roosevelt, Renvoi]; Kermit
Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2450 (1999)
[hereinafter Roosevelt, Myth].
7
For a detailed recounting of the facts of Erie, see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of Erie: How
Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, Politics, and Social Change Reshape the Law, in CIVIL PROCEDURE
STORIES 21, 35–38 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d. ed. 2008). See also Tompkins v. Erie R.R., 90 F.2d 603,
604 (2d Cir. 1937).
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fell, his right arm went under the wheels of the train.8 Most of the arm was
severed, and the remainder was later amputated by doctors.9 Tompkins sued
the railroad in federal district court in New York, claiming the railroad had
been negligent in allowing the door to swing open.10
A crucial question was the duty the railroad owed to Tompkins, who
was a trespasser on its right-of-way. Pennsylvania courts had ruled that for
pedestrians on a path parallel to the tracks (as opposed to a crossing), the
railroad had a duty only “to refrain from willful or wanton injury.”11 The
railroad relied on these cases. Tompkins argued, and the railroad conceded,
that “the great weight of authority in other states [was] to the contrary,”
imposing an ordinary negligence standard.12
What law should determine the duty of care? Although Erie analysis is
now concerned with whether federal or state law should be applied, Erie
itself did not present a choice between state and federal law. No one argued
that federal law should control. There was no federal law setting the duty of
care (although given that the case concerned a railroad, there could have
been), and the Rules of Decision Act provided that in the absence of federal
law, the “laws of the several states” should govern.13 Nor did it present a
choice between state laws; no one argued that the law of any state other
than Pennsylvania should determine the duty of care. The key question was
whether it was an issue of local or of general law.14
To understand this distinction, we need to return to the analytical
framework that the district court and Second Circuit used, the one
canonically associated with, though not created by, Swift v. Tyson.15 Under
the Swift framework, there were essentially three types of law. First, there
was federal law: the Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties.16 This law
was created by the federal government, or by the National People in the
case of the Constitution, and federal courts were supreme in its
interpretation. Second, there was state law, consisting of state constitutions,
state statutes, and decisions of state courts on some common law matters
deemed “local”—typically issues such as rights to real property within the

8

Purcell, supra note 7, at 38.
Id.
10
Id. at 39, 40.
11
Tompkins, 90 F.2d at 604 (citing Falchetti v. Pa. R.R., 160 A. 859 (Pa. 1932)) (noting the
defendant’s argument that this was the current local law under Falchetti, but ultimately deciding that
“we need not go into this matter”); see also Koontz v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 163 A. 212 (Pa. 1932).
12
Tompkins, 90 F.2d at 604.
13
See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842) (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1
Stat. 73, 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006))).
14
See Tompkins, 90 F.2d at 604 (deciding that issue was one of general rather than local law).
15
41 U.S. 1; see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 102 (1945) (observing that Swift “did not
enunciate novel doctrine”).
16
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (identifying types of federal law).
9
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state.17 This law was made by state governments and state courts were its
authoritative interpreters. (Thus, for instance, both federal courts and courts
of other states would defer to the interpretation of a state statute given by
that state’s court of last resort.) Last, and oddest to the modern eye, there
was general law. General law included most of the classic common law
subjects of tort and contract.18 It was not created by any government, but
rather deduced by judges.19 And because it was not the creation of any
particular government, no court could claim to be authoritative in its
interpretation. Federal courts could come to their own conclusions about the
content of the general common law, and so could the courts of the several
states, with neither exerting any more than persuasive influence on any
other.20
At the time Erie was filed, both the district court and the Second
Circuit had ruled that the duty of care owed by a railroad to a trespasser on
its property was a question of general law.21 The railroad, of course,
disagreed, and its contrary contention formed the primary part of its
argument to the Supreme Court.22 But assuming that the lower courts were
correct as to the characterization as general law, what should the result have
been under the Swift framework? Had Tompkins sued in Pennsylvania, he
would have gotten the Pennsylvania courts’ view of the correct answer
under the general law: the “willful or wanton” standard. A New York state
court would have given him its own independent understanding: apparently
the negligence standard that most states used.23 And if Tompkins had
chosen a federal court (as he did), that court, no matter where it was

17

See Swift, 41 U.S. at 18 (describing local issues as those relating to things “immovable and
intraterritorial in their nature and character”).
18
See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Ex Parte Young and the Transformation of the Federal Courts, 18901917, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 931, 947 (2009) (“[B]y the late nineteenth century the federal courts had
stretched the ‘general’ law to include most common-law fields, including wills, contracts, torts, deeds,
mortgages, rules of evidence, and measures of damages.”).
19
See, e.g., Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 378 (1893) ([G]eneral law . . . does not
depend upon any statute, it does not spring from any local usage or custom . . . but it rests upon those
considerations of right and justice which have been gathered into the great body of the rules and
principles known as the ‘common law.’”); Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have to Do with
Jurisdiction?, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1071, 1159–60 (1994) (quoting Baugh, and describing the deductive
nature of judicial reasoning).
20
See generally Kermit Roosevelt III, Light from Dead Stars: The Procedural Adequate and
Independent State Ground Reconsidered, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1888, 1896–97 (2003) (describing
independent interpretation of general law).
21
See Tompkins v. Erie R.R., 90 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1937) (citing cases).
22
See Brief for Petitioner at 23–25, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (No. 367), 1938 WL
35347, at *23–25. The brief does not make a frontal attack on Swift, but instead argues that courts have
misapplied the doctrine, which should distinguish between local and general issues primarily by the
criterion of whether state courts have established a firm rule.
23
See N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. v. Kmetz, 193 F. 603, 606 (2d Cir. 1912).
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located, would also have given its independent interpretation of the general
law.
Tompkins knew this, of course, which is why he chose federal court:
forum shopping is law shopping, and he wanted the federal understanding
of the general law. All went according to plan in the lower courts, but at the
Supreme Court level, the case took a very different turn.
B. The Supreme Court and the Constitution
The parties, as noted above, disputed whether the railroad’s duty of
care was a matter of general law or of local law. The railroad argued in
addition that Swift had been misconstrued, and that the local–general
distinction should take into account not just the character of the issue, but
also the degree to which state courts had settled on a definite rule.24 It did
not ask the Court to overrule Swift.
That issue, however, was the one the Court took up in the first sentence
of the opinion. “The question for decision,” Justice Brandeis wrote, “is
whether the oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall now be
disapproved.”25 Brandeis found three grounds on which to fault Swift.
First, Swift, to some extent, was an exercise in statutory interpretation.
When the Rules of Decision Act directed federal courts to use the “laws of
the several states” in the absence of federal law,26 did the word “laws”
include the decisions of state courts on common law matters? Swift had said
no, Brandeis wrote, but “the more recent research of a competent scholar,”
namely Brandeis’s friend Charles Warren, “established that the construction
given to [the Act] by the Court was erroneous.”27
Warren may or may not have been right on this point,28 but the
argument about the correct interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act (I
will call this “statutory Erie”) would not by itself have been enough to lead
the Court to overturn Swift. Stare decisis, the Court often observes, has
greater force in cases of statutory interpretation, and when the Court has
applied one reading of a statute for a century or more, it will take more than
competent scholarship to make it change course. Erie itself says as much.29
The second problem was that Swift had turned out to work rather
poorly in practice. The fact that federal courts were not bound to follow
24

See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 22, at 24–25.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69 (1938) (footnote omitted).
26
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
27
Erie, 604 U.S. at 72–73 & n.5 (citing Charles Warren, ew Light on the History of the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 51–52, 81–88, 108 (1923)).
28
See Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal
Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 760 & n.117 (1986); Green, supra note
1, at 600 n.23.
29
See Erie, 304 U.S. at 77 (“If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we should
not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century.”).
25
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state courts on matters of general law meant that there were frequently two
different rules of law in force inside a single state, either of which was
available to a party able to get into federal court. The strategic invocation of
federal jurisdiction produced a predictable set of horror stories,30 and the
resultant uncertainty proved more generally undesirable.31
Viewed with the benefit of hindsight, the Swift regime seems
misguided. But things might have turned out much better. The aim, or at
least the hope, of the Swift approach was presumably that the federal
interpretation of the general law would win acceptance in state courts.32 If
this occurred, the result would be law that was uniform not only within a
single state but across the whole nation—a very desirable consequence for
commercial law, Swift’s subject.
Experience, Erie admits, discouraged this prophecy. “Persistence of
state courts in their own opinions on questions of common law prevented
uniformity; and the impossibility of discovering a satisfactory line of
demarcation between the province of general law and that of local law
developed a new well of uncertainties.”33 So the second aspect of Erie (I
will call this “policy Erie”) is the desire that a federal court exercising
diversity jurisdiction be, for practical purposes, “only another court of the
State,” as Felix Frankfurter put it.34 Swift had thwarted this policy, and
Brandeis hoped to further it.
This policy concern would for some have been a sufficient reason to
overturn Swift. But Erie declined to rest on the policy argument, deeming it
an inadequate justification to “abandon a doctrine so widely applied
throughout nearly a century.”35 Instead, Erie turned to a third problem with
Swift: “the unconstitutionality of the course pursued,” Brandeis wrote, “has
now been made clear and compels us to [abandon it].”36 Thus, according to
Brandeis, there is also a third, constitutional, basis for the decision (I will
call this “constitutional Erie”).37 But what is it?

30
Likely the most famous is Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928), where a taxi company reincorporated under another state’s law in
order to create diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 523–24.
31
Erie, 304 U.S. at 74.
32
See id. (“[T]he benefits expected to flow from the rule [in Swift] did not accrue.”).
33
Id. (footnote omitted).
34
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
35
Erie, 304 U.S. at 77.
36
Id. at 77–78.
37
The availability of the alternative ground of policy explains why it was at one time “fashionable”
to call the constitutional argument dictum. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 693, 702 n.59 (1974). But that practice was apparently ended by Alfred Hill’s trenchant
observation that “it is difficult to view as dictum the Court’s statement of a legal proposition without
which, we are assured in the opinion, and have no reason to doubt, the case would have been decided the
other way.” Hill, supra note 3, at 439.
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There is a surprising amount of disagreement about Erie’s
constitutional source.38 But the basic outline should be relatively clear. The
main move that constitutional Erie makes—the fulcrum on which all else
turns—is to deny the existence of the general law. Swift’s “fallacy,”
Brandeis says, quoting Justice Holmes, is
the assumption that there is “a transcendental body of law outside of any
particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute,”
that federal courts have the power to use their judgment as to what the rules of
common law are; and that in the federal courts “the parties are entitled to an
independent judgment on matters of general law”—: “but law in the sense in
which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority
behind it. The common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called
common law or not, is not the common law generally but the law of that State
existing by the authority of that State . . . .”39

So Erie’s central claim is that the idea of general law, produced by no
sovereign and hence possessing no authoritative interpreter, is simply
specious. “There is no federal general common law,” Brandeis wrote40—a
slight imprecision, because what he meant was that there was no general
law at all. The rules that courts applied in diversity cases could not be
drawn from what Holmes derided as a “brooding omnipresence in the
sky.”41 They had to come from some government, either state or federal.
As I have already said, no one thought these rules were federal law
made by the federal government. If they had been, all the Swift-era
“diversity” cases would have been federal question cases. And so the
problem of intrastate disuniformity would not have arisen because the
federal law would have preempted contrary state laws. Obviously, neither
of these situations obtained under Swift.
Moreover, they could not be federal, for the federal government does
not have a general lawmaking power; it has the specific powers the
Constitution gives it.42 As Brandeis put it, “Congress has no power to
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they
be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be they commercial law or a part of the

38

See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Erie’s Constitutional Source, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1289, 1289 (2007)
(“The constitutional rationale of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins has remained elusive for almost seventy
years.” (footnote omitted)).
39
Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
40
Id. at 78.
41
S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
42
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (defining as a “first principle[]” that
“[t]he Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers” (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1,
§ 8)).
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law of torts.”43 So the general practice under Swift was unconstitutional,
even though Congress, had it wanted, could have regulated in some cases.44
In any case, Congress had not exercised its regulatory power, so the
only possible source of law was the states45—or, conceivably, the federal
courts. Can federal courts make law in diversity cases without
congressional direction? Here Erie scholars diverge, some assuming that
the lawmaking power of the federal courts is coextensive with that of
Congress and some suggesting it is likely far narrower.46 The idea that
federal courts can make law at will on any issue within the scope of
congressional legislative power strikes me as prima facie implausible.
Congress is a politically accountable branch, one of whose houses, in the
original design, was responsible directly to state legislatures, and it is quite
a stretch to suppose that the Constitution implicitly vested equivalent
lawmaking power in unelected and life-tenured federal judges.47
But what lawmaking power the federal courts might have in other
cases is, like the reach of congressional power, beside the point as far as
Erie itself is concerned. In Erie, the Supreme Court did not seem inclined
make any federal common law of railroad duties of care, even if it could
43

Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. Again, this is imprecise because Congress does have the power to declare
many rules of law binding in a state. For example, given that Erie was about a railroad’s duty of care,
Congress could certainly have used its power over interstate commerce to prescribe a rule to govern that
case, had it so chosen. What Brandeis presumably meant was that Congress could not legislate over the
whole range of topics covered by the general law, or that the mere existence of diversity jurisdiction
does not create federal lawmaking power. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of
Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 926 (1986).
44
Such federal law would, however, have created federal question jurisdiction and presumably
preempted contrary state law, so the result would be federalization rather than restoration of Swift’s
independent state and federal interpretation.
45
What the content of this state law might be is a separate question. Erie affirmed that state courts
were authoritative in the interpretation of their own law. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (“[W]hether the law of
the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a
matter of federal concern.”). Michael S. Green has explored the possibility that the Swift approach might
be permissible if state courts announced that their interpretations of state law were not to be taken as
authoritative. Michael Steven Green, Erie’s Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1111, 1121–35
(2011). The idea is intriguing, but I am not persuaded that state courts actually understood the Swift-era
practice in this light. Brandeis and the Justices in the majority clearly did not; they saw it as resting on
the existence of a general common law created by no sovereign and in whose interpretation no court
could be authoritative.
46
See Clark, supra note 38 (describing the dispute).
47
See id. at 1302–06 (describing political safeguards of federalism governing federal legislation).
On the other hand, the founding generation’s understanding of common law differed from ours, so
originalist arguments may be of little use in this area. See Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the
Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263, 279–284 (1992) (“Although the historical background generally
supports the claim that federal judges can make common law, I would not rely on it for too much
guidance. One problem is that what it means today to say that judges have common law powers is totally
different from what it meant to say this in the 18th and early 19th centuries.”). I think Kramer’s general
view is right: federal courts can make law whenever necessary (i.e., in exclusively federal enclaves) or
when necessary and proper to implement a statute. See id. at 288.
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have. With no federal lawmaking power exercised, there was no federal law
on point, so the only alternative was state law.48 Continuing to follow Swift
once the existence of general law was disavowed would be to exercise the
coercive power of the federal courts without any law to justify it.49
C. The Erie Problem and Choice of Law
Where does this leave us? Erie has a statutory basis that counts for
little, a policy basis that is obvious but—according to the Court—
insufficient to produce the decision, and a constitutional ground that is also
pretty obvious. If there is no federal law on point (and leaving aside the
disagreements about whether there could be in various cases), a federal
court must apply state law because that is the only law that could be
operative. To state the principle more generally, constitutional Erie tells us
that if only one law reaches the facts of a case, that law must supply the rule
of decision.50
To those experienced with choice of law, this principle may have a
familiar ring: it is essentially Brainerd Currie’s analysis of “false
conflicts.”51 But a little more explanation is in order to show that Erie is
actually a choice-of-law case.
A choice-of-law problem, to put it generally, arises when there is more
than one sovereign whose law might create rights or obligations related to a
particular event.52 Scholars and courts have come up with a dizzying array
of methodologies to choose which law should be used to decide such
cases.53 Despite their creativity—or, more likely, because of it—the field is
widely regarded as a conceptual disaster.54

48
Since no one thought that the general law was federal law, Erie does not actually limit the scope
of federal lawmaking authority. Instead, it expands the scope of state lawmaking by announcing that
what had been thought general law is in fact state law.
49
What is the constitutional problem with doing that? Sourcing Erie to a particular constitutional
provision is notoriously difficult, and it is not my main purpose here. I will only suggest, without
attempting a full defense of the claim, that the Due Process Clause, which protects against state coercion
“without . . . law” is the best candidate. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
50
Erie also has some other propositions that sound constitutional in nature—for instance, that a
state’s law is what that state’s courts say it is, not what someone else might think is a good idea. See
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (“[W]hether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or
by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern.”).
51
See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963)
(creating a taxonomy of choice-of-law cases, including “true conflicts,” “false conflicts,” and
“unprovided-for cases”).
52
See KERMIT ROOSEVELT, III, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1 (2010).
53
See id. at 3–105 (explaining traditional and modern approaches).
54
See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1407 (1996)
(“[C]onflicts of law is dead—killed by a realism intended to save it.”).
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A better way to approach a choice-of-law problem, I and others have
suggested,55 is via what I call the two-step model. The first task for a court
in a choice-of-law case is to determine which sovereigns might attach legal
consequences to the events and which have in fact done so. This is a matter
of interpreting the sovereigns’ laws to determine their scope. If more than
one law reaches the facts of the case and the rights they create conflict, the
court must proceed to a second step: it must decide which of the competing
rights will get priority. If, however, only one law creates rights or
obligations, that law will—indeed, must—supply the rule of decision.
That principle, of course, is the same one I just identified as
constitutional Erie. So it should seem prima facie plausible that the model
that generates this principle (and hence resolves Erie on its facts) might also
be a useful way to approach more difficult Erie problems.
Of course, this is not the path that Erie analysis has taken. The
conventional statement of the basic rule—that federal courts exercising
diversity jurisdiction apply state substantive law but federal procedure—
suggests that the task is essentially one of characterization: courts must
decide whether a particular issue is substantive or procedural.56 But the
Supreme Court soon recognized that trying to draw this distinction in some
abstract sense was a poor way to proceed.57 Policy Erie—the desire to avoid
forum shopping—led the Court in Guaranty Trust v. York to say that some
laws deemed procedural by the state that created them (a limitations period
in Guaranty Trust itself) would nonetheless be considered substantive for
Erie purposes and hence given effect in federal court if they were outcomedeterminative.
Guaranty Trust’s analysis implied that substance and procedure were
not stable and mutually exclusive categories because a law could be
procedural in the view of state courts and yet substantive under Erie.
Further, the converse was also possible: a law that the state deemed
substantive might address the same issue as, and therefore overlap with, a
federal procedural rule. Sometimes, the Court hinted in Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Electrical Cooperative, such a law might be so substantive that the

55

Brainerd Currie’s interest analysis is probably the first self-conscious development of a two-step
approach to choice of law in American scholarship. See CURRIE, supra note 51, at 183–84 (setting out a
two-step process of identifying interested states and resolving cases accordingly). Larry Kramer refined
Currie’s approach. Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 982 (1991) (describing
the two-step approach). This Article is part of my attempt to carry the project further. See generally
ROOSEVELT, supra note 52 (offering an analytical overview of conflict of laws from a two-step
perspective).
56
See, e.g., Armando Gustavo Hernandez, The Head-on Collision of Gasperini and the Derailment
of Erie: Exposing the Futility of the Accommodation Doctrine, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 191, 199 n.51
(2010).
57
See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
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federal court would have to give it effect.58 Other times the federal
procedural rule might be followed.59 Subsequent cases would show that
whether the court applied state or federal law depended not just on how
substantive the state law was, but also on whether the federal rule was one
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or judge-made law created to fill
gaps in the rules.60 Erie analysis, as taught to generations of first-year
students, follows an ever more complicated flowchart, where surprising
twists and turns abound.61
What if we think about Erie as a choice-of-law problem instead, using
the two-step model?62 Things turn out to be somewhat simpler. The court’s
task, remember, is first to determine the scope of the different sovereigns’
laws, and then to assign priority to one or the other if conflicts exist.
Erie itself is easy to understand from this perspective. With the general
law out of the picture, the question of the railroad’s duty of care fell within
the scope of only one sovereign’s law (Pennsylvania’s); of course its law
would govern. Erie analysis, the more general choice between federal and
state law, can also be described within the two-step model. First, the court
must decide whether federal law or state law grants rights to the parties, or
whether both laws do—whether the case falls within the scope of the
different laws. Second, if conflicting rights exist, the court must decide
which will get priority—whether the federal law will preempt the state law.
What is the advantage of describing Erie analysis in this way? I hope
in subsequent sections to demonstrate that it resolves several puzzles. Here
I will make just a few preliminary observations.
First, thinking about the scope of laws offers us a useful way to
understand the meaning and relevance of the distinction between substance
and procedure. Substantive law, we could say, creates rights that can be
asserted in any forum.63 Procedural law creates rights that are tied to a
particular forum and cannot be asserted elsewhere.64
58
356 U.S. 525, 535–36 (1958) (noting that a state rule may be so “bound up with the definition of
the rights and obligations of the parties” that “its application in federal court is required”).
59
See id. at 537–38 (noting that federal policy may direct application of federal law).
60
Compare Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure), with Ragan v.
Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (judge-made law).
61
See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 5, at 990.
62
For prior suggestions to view Erie from a choice-of-law perspective, see, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer,
The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1235 (1999); John R. Leathers, Erie and Its Progeny as Choice of Law Cases, 11 HOUS. L. REV.
791 (1974). This Article offers the same prescription but differs by employing the two-step
understanding of choice of law.
63
A tort claim, for instance, is uncontroversially substantive, and it should also be uncontroversial
that a tort claim based on the law of one state can be asserted in the courts of another.
64
The right to use a certain number of pages in a reply brief, for example, is uncontroversially
procedural, and it is also pretty clear that one state’s rule about permissible length will not govern
litigation in the courts of another state.
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This definition does not give us any foolproof or mechanical way to
decide whether a particular rule is substantive or procedural. We will still
have to do something similar to what courts have done in the past—ask,
perhaps, whether the law is designed to regulate in-court or out-of-court
behavior. But it does allow us to be clear about the significance of the
substance–procedure distinction and to state the problem simply. State
procedural law will never be given effect in federal courts; it creates no
rights that can be asserted there. State substantive law may be given effect
in federal court; but it might also be displaced by conflicting federal
procedural law.
That is Erie analysis as far as scope is concerned. Already, I believe,
there is some payoff from the two-step model in terms of a better
understanding of substance and procedure. Classically, substance and
procedure were conceived of as mutually exclusive categories.65 If that is
the case, one might wonder how state substantive and federal procedural
law could ever overlap and conflict. One might also think that the Erie
problem is simply how to decide whether a particular rule is “really”
substantive or procedural.
The two-step model takes us beyond this classic formalism. Of course,
modern thinking also holds that the categories are not mutually exclusive.66
But if they are not distinct conceptual boxes, what are they? Modern Erie
analysis does not have a very good answer. It still leaves us with an idea of
two incompletely overlapping categories and a muddy middle ground of
things that might be substantive for some purposes but procedural for
others.
By contrast, defining substance and procedure in terms of forumindependence and forum-dependence—that is, in terms of the scope of the
laws—makes plain how they can conflict: both state substantive and federal
procedural law create rights that litigants in federal court can assert.67
What about the muddy middle ground? How can something be both
substantive and procedural, and how should such a hybrid be treated? If we
think in terms of the scope of the rights created, these things are not
65

See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465–66 (tracking the dissolution of the “traditional or common-sense
substance-procedure distinction”).
66
See, e.g., Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV.
801, 802 (2010) (“[P]rocedure is inherently substantive . . . [and] the converse is also true.”). The
Supreme Court recognized the point in 1945. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108–09
(1945).
67
A state might, for instance, create a tort cause of action and give the plaintiff five years to sue on
the grounds that the full extent of this particular kind of injury cannot be immediately determined. That
is a justification that applies regardless of the forum; it means that the five-year period is substantive.
The federal government might, however, have a rule that all tort claims must be brought within four
years. This is surely a procedural rule as I have defined the term—it is intended to promote timely filing
in federal court and will not operate in state courts. But in federal court, it will conflict with the
substantive state right.
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mysterious either. Some rules will have both procedural and substantive
(forum-dependent and forum-independent) purposes behind them.
Limitations periods, at issue in Guaranty Trust, are one example. The
consequence is straightforward. If there is a substantive purpose, a right can
be asserted in any forum, regardless of whether there is also a procedural
purpose whose scope is limited to particular courts.
But, one might ask, what about state procedural rules that are
substantive for Erie purposes? In Guaranty Trust, the Supreme Court held
that some outcome-determinative rules (notably including limitations
periods) would be given effect in federal court even if the state that created
them classed them as procedural. Such rules might seem to pose a problem
for the choice-of-law-based analysis—are they not state procedural rules
that are given effect in federal court, contrary to my definition of substance
and procedure?
No, they are not. If a state rule is procedural in my sense, constitutional
Erie tells us that it cannot be used to decide an issue in federal court.68 A
federal case falls outside the scope of a state procedural rule—the state rule
creates no rights that can be asserted in federal court—and so federal law
must supply the rule of decision. The scope of state law is a matter of state
law; a federal court lacks the power to decide that, regardless of what the
state wants, the state’s law will give rights to certain parties.69
What then are we to make of Guaranty Trust? There are two
explanations that the choice-of-law perspective offers. First, as to the
specific facts of the case itself, it is probably wrong to call limitations
periods procedural. A limitations period does have a procedural purpose,
which is to allocate judicial resources to the litigation of fresh rather than
stale claims. And were that its only purpose, it might reasonably be classed
as procedural and its assertion limited to a particular forum. But it is also
intended to give defendants peace of mind after a prescribed period, and
that is clearly a right intended to be conveyed regardless of forum—that is,
a substantive right. It is thus no surprise that the traditional characterization

68
This point may not be intuitively obvious, but further reflection should convince any skeptics. If a
state statute contains explicit limits on the scope of the rights it creates, a federal court cannot disregard
those limits and still claim to be enforcing a state-law right. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop.,
356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958). This is obviously true with respect to, say, the elements of a cause of action—
a federal court cannot decide to require only three when the state law has four—and no less true with
regard to a limit providing that the right may be asserted only in state court, so long as that limit is
constitutional.
69
For example, if a state wrongful death statute limits its scope to deaths “caused in this state,” a
federal court surely lacks power to award recovery under it for an out-of-state accident. Some
complications exist—there are presumably some rights that a state could not grant litigants in its courts
but withhold from those in federal court, in just the same way that it could not withhold them from
parties in the courts of other states. See Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 360 (1914).
But those would be rights that are not even arguably procedural in the sense of governing in-court
behavior.
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of limitations periods as procedural has been widely rejected by states
through the enactment of borrowing statutes.70
Second, and more generally, when a federal court decides to apply a
rule that a state deems procedural on the ground that it is outcomedeterminative, it is not giving state-created rights an effect that their creator
disclaimed, because it lacks the power to do this.71 Rather, it is creating
federal law that incorporates the substance of the state rule. Incorporation of
state law is actually relatively common.72 Even when constitutional Erie
tells us that federal law must supply the rule of decision because there is no
state law on point, then policy Erie may suggest that the federal law should
incorporate a state rule.
So the choice-of-law perspective gives us a simpler understanding of
what is at stake in Erie analysis. It gives us a better account of what is going
on in Guaranty Trust-type situations: in accordance with Erie’s policy goal
of substantial uniformity, the federal court is making federal law that tracks
the law of the state in which it sits.73 In the remainder of this Article, I will
try to show some other connections between Erie and choice of law.
Erie analysis can help us better see how choice of law should work—
Erie will turn out to have implications in state courts as well as federal
ones.74 Choice-of-law analysis, in turn, can explain some of Erie’s
progeny—notably, it can explain why Erie analysis differs depending on
the source of the federal rule.75 Putting the two together can tell us
something about still other problems, such as how federal courts should
deal with state choice-of-law rules in the context of the Class Action
Fairness Act.76 To start, though, I will turn to Erie’s most direct descendant
in the realm of choice of law: Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing
Co.77

70

See generally Ibrahim J. Wani, Borrowing Statutes, Statutes of Limitations and Modern Choice of
Law, 57 UMKC. L. REV. 681 (1989) (discussing borrowing statutes).
71
Again, a federal court lacks power to expand the scope of a state right. Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533–34 (1949) (“[W]e cannot give [the cause of action] longer life in
the federal court than it would have had in the state court without adding something to the cause of
action.”).
72
Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S 497 (2001) (incorporating state preclusion
rules) is a notable example in the Erie context.
73
I think that this account is better because the idea that Guaranty Trust means that a federal court
can override a state’s characterization of its own law is constitutionally untenable.
74
See infra Part III.A.
75
See infra Part III.C.
76
See infra Part III.D.
77
313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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II. KLAXO
A. The Decision
Erie, dealing with a railroad engaged in interstate commerce, did not
provide the best facts to illustrate the thesis that general law issues lay
beyond the power of the federal government. Similarly, Klaxon’s facts are a
poor choice to illustrate the principles for which it stands, and although I
will propose altering them to facilitate analysis, it is nonetheless worth
stating them briefly.
In 1918, Stentor Electric Manufacturing, a New York corporation,
transferred its entire business to Klaxon Company, a Delaware
corporation.78 Klaxon agreed to use its best efforts to manufacture and sell
some devices for which Stentor held patents and to give Stentor a share of
the profits.79 In 1929, unhappy with Klaxon’s efforts, Stentor sued in the
federal district court in Delaware.80 As the contract was formed in New
York and performance began there, the district court applied New York
substantive law.81 In 1939, Stentor won a jury verdict for $100,000.82 It then
sought to increase the judgment by adding 6% interest dating from the
filing of the suit on June 1, 1929.83 Such interest was allowed under New
York law, but not, as the plaintiff alleged, under the law of Delaware.84
Whose law should determine whether this interest should be allowed?
From the Erie perspective, this was an issue of substantive law, so Erie
answered that state law should determine it. But which state’s law?
Deciding between Delaware and New York required an interstate choice-oflaw decision turning on whether the availability of interest was substantive
or procedural (this distinction operating now in the choice-of-law sense,
rather than the Erie sense). Substantive issues in choice of law are
determined by the law providing the cause of action (in this case, New
York), while procedural ones are determined by the law of the forum (in
this case, Delaware). In an opinion by Herbert Goodrich, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals pronounced the availability of interest to be substantive:
“[I]t is clear by what we think is undoubtedly the better view of the law that
the rules for ascertaining the measure of damages are not a matter of
procedure at all, but are matters of substance . . . .”85
What law was the court using to resolve this choice-of-law question—
to decide whether the issue was substantive or procedural? It cited no state
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
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law as support for its characterization, but rather relied on the First
Restatement of Conflicts and two treatises, one written by Joseph Beale (the
Reporter of the First Restatement), and one by Herbert Goodrich (the author
of the opinion).86 The oracular pronouncement that this was “the better
view” certainly smacked of the forbidden general law. But because that no
longer existed at the time of the Third Circuit’s decision in 1940, it would
be more charitable to read Goodrich’s opinion as federal common law. This
would be permissible if choice-of-law rules were procedural in the Erie
sense—then federal courts would of course apply federal choice-of-law
rules and state courts would apply state rules.
But, said the Supreme Court, they are not. “We are of opinion that the
prohibition declared in Erie . . . against such independent determinations by
the federal courts, extends to the field of conflict of laws.”87 In the Erie
sense, choice-of-law rules are substantive and federal courts must therefore
apply those of the states. The facts of Klaxon are complicated, dealing as
they do with the substance–procedure characterization, but the reasoning
seems fairly straightforward. Federal courts apply state substantive law in
diversity actions, and choice-of-law rules are substantive; hence, federal
courts must apply state choice-of-law rules.
B. Assessment
While Erie is generally celebrated in the legal academy,88 Klaxon has
received a much more mixed reception. Henry Hart and others have
criticized it as destructive of much of the intended benefit of diversity
jurisdiction, which aimed to protect out-of-staters from unfavorable local
law as well as biased courts.89 And even those who favor Klaxon do not
give it as much respect as Erie. Klaxon is not constitutionally grounded,
most people think; it is merely a policy-based extension of the Erie
doctrine.90 Erie, on this view, tells us that federal courts exercising diversity

86

Id. at 275–76 (“With regard to the item of interest as damages for breach of a contract the
Restatement of Conflict of Laws, § 418 says: ‘The rate of interest allowed as part of the damages for the
breach of a contract is determined by the law of the place of performance.’ See also Goodrich on
Conflict of Laws (2d Ed. 1938) 215 and cases cited in note 101; 2 Beale, The Conflict of Laws (1935)
1335 and cases cited in note 6.”).
87
Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
88
See Green, supra note 1, at 595 & n.2.
89
See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489,
513–15 (1954); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 282 (1992); see also, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers,
The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave ew World for Erie and
Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79 (1993) (critiquing Erie and Klaxon); Scott Fruehwald, Choice of Law in
Federal Courts: A Reevaluation, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 21 (1998) (criticizing Klaxon).
90
See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A
Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1502 (2008) (noting that Klaxon is “not constitutionally
required”); Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in ational Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
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jurisdiction should apply the substantive law of the states in which they sit.
Klaxon just takes the modest additional step of deciding that choice-of-law
rules are substantive for Erie purposes, much as Guaranty Trust made that
decision for limitations periods.91
I will argue that this view of Klaxon is seriously mistaken, but the
analysis will prove easier to follow and likely more convincing if we
consider not the facts of Klaxon itself, but a slightly different situation. This
is not an attempt to tilt the field in my favor but rather to return it to level.
Klaxon is a decision about the status of choice-of-law rules under Erie, but
it features the esoteric and somewhat confusing example of substance–
procedure characterization. Characterization is a persistent problem in
choice of law, but it is not the main focus. Instead, choice-of-law rules
primarily do two things, corresponding to the two steps of the model set out
earlier. First, choice-of-law rules set the scope of state law.92 They
determine who can claim rights under state law—what people, where, and
in what circumstances. In this function, they are what I call “rules of
scope.” Second, they resolve conflicts between state laws.93 They determine
which of two conflicting rights under different states’ laws will prevail. In
this function, they are what I call “rules of priority.”
Let us suppose, then, that rather than a substance–procedure
characterization, we are dealing with the more usual issues of scope and
priority. Suppose that a married couple from Iowa drives into Kansas and
gets into an accident there, for which the wife sues the husband. As far as
substantive law goes, suppose that Iowa follows the doctrine of interspousal
tort immunity: Iowa does not allow spouses to sue each other. Kansas does
not follow the doctrine, so spouses may sue each other under its law. As far
as choice of law goes, Kansas follows the traditional territorialist approach,
deciding tort cases under the law of the place of injury, while Iowa has
adopted the more modern Restatement (Second) of Conflicts, which directs
courts to apply the law of the state with the “most significant relationship”
to an issue in dispute.94
How will the states approach this case? They need to determine the
scope of the relevant laws and their relative priority if a conflict exists. But
they would do so in different ways, consistent with the different approaches
to choice of law they have adopted.
The Kansas court would focus on the location of the accident. Because
the accident occurred in Kansas, the territorialist approach holds, the
parties’ rights and liabilities must be determined in accordance with Kansas
2001, 2027 (2008) (“The Klaxon rule . . . is not required either by the Constitution or by the Rules of
Decision Act.”).
91
See supra text accompanying notes 68–69.
92
See ROOSEVELT, supra note 52.
93
Id. at 2.
94
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145, 188 (1971).

18

106:1 (2012)

Choice of Law in Federal Courts

law. As far as scope goes, Kansas law attaches legal consequences and
other laws do not. Because no other state’s law reaches the accident, there is
no need for a determination of relative priority: Kansas law governs and the
wife prevails. (According to the Kansas view of things, that is, this accident
presents the same kind of situation as Erie: the accident falls within the
scope of only one sovereign’s law.)
An Iowa court, by contrast, would not use state borders to circumscribe
the scope of state law. Using the Second Restatement, it would assume that
state laws have broad scope, possibly as broad as the Constitution allows.95
Kansas law grants the wife a cause of action, but Iowa law provides the
husband with a defense. Finding conflicting rights, the Iowa court would
proceed to a priority determination: it would ask which state has the most
significant relationship to the issue of interspousal tort immunity. It would
decide that this state is Iowa, as the state of the marital domicile, and it
would apply Iowa law: the husband prevails.96
Analysis in Kansas Court

Analysis in Iowa Court

Scope:

Only Kansas law creates rights

Both states’ laws create rights

Priority:

No need for priority
determination

Iowa law prevails

Outcome:

Wife wins

Husband wins

This revised fact pattern may make it easier to see how Klaxon works.
Klaxon says that federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply
the choice-of-law rules of the states in which they sit.97 Thus, if this case
could be heard in federal court,98 a district court in Kansas would adopt
territorialism and find no interspousal tort immunity defense available,
while one sitting in Iowa would follow the Second Restatement and give
priority to the immunity. But must the federal courts do this under
constitutional compulsion, or is Klaxon based only on policy grounds?
The argument for a constitutional basis is quite simple.99 Once a federal
court has decided, for whatever reason, to apply a state’s law, there are
limits on the extent to which it can deform that law. Suppose, for instance,
that a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction were to apply a state
95

See id. § 9.
See id. §§ 6, 169.
97
See supra text accompanying note 87.
98
As I have constructed the hypothetical, diversity jurisdiction would not be available, but
supplemental jurisdiction might be if we added appropriate additional facts.
99
See Roosevelt, Renvoi, supra note 6, at 1861–64.
96
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statute that required a plaintiff to show four elements of a tort to recover.
Could the judge decide that in federal court only three elements would be
required? Certainly not, at least if she still claimed to be applying state
law.100
What if the issue were not about the required elements of the cause of
action, but about the geographical scope of state law? What if the statute
said that it applied to all torts “committed within this state”? There, too, the
federal court could not disregard that geographical restriction and still claim
to be applying state law.101 And why should the analysis change if the scope
of state law is set not by statutory language, but rather by a choice-of-law
approach developed by the state’s high court? Statutory Erie tells us that the
decisions of state courts are part of the laws of the states.102 The scope of
state law is a question of its meaning, and no one now doubts that state
courts have the last word on the meaning of state law. As the Supreme
Court put it later in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative,
“[F]ederal courts . . . must respect the definition of state-created rights and
obligations by the state courts.”103
So the federal court should not be free to disregard a state’s definition
of the scope of its law, whether that definition is accomplished through
explicit statutory language or through choice-of-law rules.104 On the facts I
have set out, a federal court that decided to apply Kansas law would have to
respect the territorial limits Kansas courts placed on its scope, and one
applying Iowa law would have to respect the fact that the Iowa courts do
not consider their law territorially limited. Doing anything else would not
truly be applying state law.
Klaxon is constitutionally grounded, according to this argument, to the
extent that it directs federal courts to follow state rules about the scope of
their law. The argument that state choice-of-law rules are substantive in this
sense—so much a part of state-created rights that a court that ignores them
is not really applying the law of that state—is both straightforward and
strong. We could even describe it as an application of constitutional Erie:
on the issue of the scope of a state law, the state has power and the federal

100
See, e.g., Green, supra note 45, at 1167 (noting that Erie requires federal courts to follow state
supreme court interpretations of state law).
101
Id. The rule that the Supreme Court has announced here is that federal courts must apply state
law as the state courts have interpreted it, so I am assuming that state courts applied the statutes as
written—limiting the geographical scope in this example, and requiring four elements of the tort in the
prior example.
102
See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72, 79 (1938).
103
356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958).
104
Interestingly, the Supreme Court has accepted this point in the context of the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA). See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 10–13 (1962) (interpreting reference to
state “law” in FTCA to include choice-of-law rules).
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government does not;105 therefore, state and not federal law must be
consulted to determine scope.
So a Kansas court, to return to my modified Klaxon fact pattern, would
be entitled to say that Kansas tort law gave rights to all persons and only
persons injured within the state, and a federal court—whether sitting in
Kansas or not—would have to respect that definition. The Iowa court would
be entitled to decide the scope of Iowa law and federal courts would
likewise have to respect that definition.106
That is the analysis with respect to the scope of state law. Matters of
priority are different. States are entitled to decide, within constitutional
limits, who can claim rights under their laws and who cannot—that is a
question of the meaning of their laws. But obviously no one state can have
the last word on the question of whose rights will prevail in case of a
conflict. State rules of priority are not binding, either on federal courts or
the courts of sister states, because whether a right created by one state’s law
should prevail over a right created by another is not a matter within the
authority of any single state—it is not a question of the meaning of state
law.107 The question of priority is therefore a question on which federal
courts should be independent, though for policy reasons—policy Erie, in
fact—it will usually be desirable to maintain intrastate uniformity by
following the rules of priority of the state in which they sit. When a state is
unreasonably aggressive in its rule of priority, however—when it privileges
local law over foreign law to an unreasonable degree108—a federal court is
free to resolve the conflict differently.
As I would analyze my modified Klaxon fact pattern, all federal courts
would be required to recognize that a conflict exists between Kansas law
105

The federal government has the power to preempt state law, of course, but a federal court
exercising diversity jurisdiction does not purport to be exercising that power.
106
Later I will argue that state courts must also defer to sister states on the scope of their law. See
infra Part III.A.
107
Such issues are not disputes between states as parties, and therefore there is no need for a
federal-law solution that binds both. But they otherwise fit the description of interstate disputes that
cannot be controlled by state law. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural
Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1325 (1996) (“Because states are coequal sovereigns under
the Constitution, neither party to an interstate dispute has legislative power to prescribe rules of decision
binding upon the other.” (footnote omitted)).
108
Adoption of state law while reserving a veto power to protect federal interests is relatively
common. See Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1904–05 (describing the practice). And it should also be clear
that an unreasonable disregard of foreign law undermines the federal interest in diversity jurisdiction:
providing a level playing field for litigants. See Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV.
493, 537–43, 558–59 nn.234, 236 (2008). The harder question is what counts as unreasonable. I would
expect the reserved federal veto to be invoked in only a very few situations, perhaps only two: first,
when a state court used its own limitations period to extend an action despite having no contacts with the
underlying events, see Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988), and second, when it relied on
“public policy” to sever a limit on a foreign cause of action, see Kilberg v. Ne. Airlines, Inc., 172
N.E.2d 526, 527–28 (N.Y. 1961).
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and Iowa law. That is a question of scope. Each state says, through its
choice-of-law rules, that its law reaches the case, and those determinations
must be respected. At the priority stage, each state says that its law
prevails—Kansas because it gives priority to the territorially appropriate
law, and Iowa because it believes the state of marital domicile has the most
significant relationship. Neither state court can bind the other on this
question, and neither can bind a federal court, though for policy reasons a
federal court in Kansas should probably follow the Kansas rule, and
likewise for one in Iowa.109
C. Recapitulation
The next Part of this Article will discuss the implications of the twostep view of Erie and Klaxon for various doctrinal and theoretical puzzles.
But first, it may be worth attempting a brief summary for the sake of clarity.
What I have argued thus far is the following:
The significant move in Erie is its denial of the existence of the general
law. Once that proposition is accepted, everything else follows in quite
straightforward fashion. On its facts, Erie is basically a choice-of-law
decision holding that if only one law reaches the facts—if only one
sovereign has attempted to (or has power to) regulate the relevant
transaction or occurrence—then that law must supply the rule of decision.
Erie also has a policy basis, which is the desire to preserve uniformity
between state and federal courts within a single state. This policy should
guide analysis in resolving choice-of-law problems between state
substantive law and federal procedure—it should help us decide when
overlapping federal procedure preempts state substance. And it should help
us decide when federal law should incorporate state law, which is what
109
One might well ask why federal courts should be merely independent, rather than authoritative.
If a federal court makes a rule of priority, why is that not federal common law that preempts inconsistent
state law? If the federal court were making rules of priority pursuant to a direction from Congress, or if
Congress legislated, I believe the federal rules of priority would be preemptive. For a discussion of such
legislation, see Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of
Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1 (1991). Uniform federal rules of priority, promulgated under Congress’s
Full Faith and Credit Clause power, would actually be a nice thing to have. In the absence of
congressional action, however, the federal lawmaking is based only on necessity: no state has the power
to answer the priority question authoritatively, so federal courts must be independent. See Hinderlider v.
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (noting that question of rival state
claims to water was one “upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be
conclusive”). If states lacked power to answer the priority question at all, then this necessity-born
federal law would also supply the rule of decision in state court, as it did in Hinderlider. Id. at 107. But
given the traditional practice of allowing states wide latitude to decide the issue of priority under their
own law in their own courts, see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307–08 (1981), giving the
federal rule of priority preemptive force seems a step too far. Alternatively, if this federal common law
were to have preemptive force, it could still work by incorporating the preexisting state rule as the Court
did in Semtek. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 506–09 (2001) (incorporating
state preclusion rules to determine effect of federal court diversity judgments).
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happens when a state procedural law is characterized as substantive for Erie
purposes.110
Klaxon makes obvious sense given the policy aims of Erie. But it also
has a constitutional source in that once a federal court decides to apply the
law of a state, it is not free to alter the content of that law. It must respect
the state definition of rights and obligations, and choice-of-law rules about
the scope of state law are part of that definition. States have the power to set
the scope of their laws; federal courts do not.
Rules of priority are different. The relative priority of two states’ laws
is a question on which no single state can be authoritative. Federal courts
are independent of state law on issues of priority. For policy reasons, they
will usually incorporate the rules of priority of the states in which they sit,
but they reserve a “federal veto”—the power to diverge from a state rule of
priority that unreasonably disfavors foreign law.
III. APPLICATIONS
Thus far, I have argued for an understanding of Erie and Klaxon that is
informed by a choice-of-law perspective. That is, it attempts to view the
cases within the analytical framework that I have elsewhere suggested is
appropriate for choice of law111: the two-step model that allocates authority
among sovereigns by first considering the scope of their laws and then by
using rules of priority to resolve conflicts. Erie is relatively trivial from this
perspective once the general law is disposed of: because only one sovereign
has exercised lawmaking power, that sovereign’s law obviously must
supply the rules of decision.
Klaxon appears a little different, and here my analysis departs
substantially from the standard account. I think that my analysis of Klaxon
is better than the standard view because it reconciles the decision with
Erie’s constitutional principles—it shows how state authority over the
scope of state law is, like Erie, a situation in which only one sovereign has
exercised its regulatory power. It also explains how the “neutral umpire”
benefits of diversity jurisdiction might be retained without overruling
Klaxon entirely—if federal courts follow states as to the scope of their law
while retaining independence on priority questions.112 But I also want to
argue that the two-step model is superior to the standard account because it
helps us resolve some otherwise intractable problems. This Part of the
Article thus examines a selection of Erie–Klaxon problems that have
proven difficult or notorious.

110
111
112

See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
See, e.g., ROOSEVELT, supra note 52.
See infra text accompanying notes 147–55.
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A. Erie and Klaxon in State Courts
What could Erie and Klaxon mean for state courts? Nothing, is the
ordinary view. Erie is about the scope of federal authority and the duties of
federal courts when federal lawmaking power does not exist or has not been
exercised. It has no implications for state courts. So goes the conventional
wisdom.113
But that response is much too quick. The constitutional principle that I
drew from Erie is a basic premise about the allocation of authority between
sovereigns, and it applies just as well to interstate relations as to state–
federal ones. Erie’s facts present a situation where federal lawmaking
power does not exist or has not been exercised, with the consequence that
state law must supply the rule of decision. Surely this has an interstate
analogue: if the forum state lacks or has not exercised lawmaking authority,
some other state’s law must supply the rule of decision.
Again, the conventional wisdom would probably be to reject this
argument. Erie depended on the fact that Congress lacks a general police
power, one might say, and state legislatures have that power. There are no
topics beyond their authority in the way that the “general law” questions of
everyday tort and contract were outside congressional power in Erie.
But this response is demonstrably wrong, even speaking solely in terms
of our current caselaw. There are topics beyond the lawmaking power of
the states, and the Supreme Court has said so. One such topic is the rights
and obligations arising from events that have no connection to the forum
state. As Michael Green puts it, “Like a federal court, a state court does not
have lawmaking power simply because it has jurisdiction over a case. The
transaction being litigated can be subject to the exclusive lawmaking power
of a sister state.”114 In such cases, the Supreme Court has explained, the
Constitution forbids the forum state from using its own law as a rule of
decision.115 Following Green, I will call the duty to use sister-state law
“horizontal Erie.”
But horizontal-Erie obligations do not arise only when the entire
transaction is outside the forum’s lawmaking authority.116 They can also
exist as to particular issues, even when other issues do fall within it. (This is
why, in the vertical context, federal courts have to follow Erie when
exercising supplemental jurisdiction117: the fact that federal law governs one
issue in a case does not necessarily mean that federal lawmaking authority
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See Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum Law, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 1237, 1239 (2011) (noting the little attention paid to this issue).
114
Id. at 1240.
115
See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981).
116
See Green, supra note 113, at 1247.
117
See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
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reaches every issue.) So what is an issue beyond the lawmaking authority of
one state?
How about the content of sister-state law? That each state has
exclusive authority over the meaning and scope of its law, subject to
constitutional limits or federal preemption, should seem fairly obvious. It
follows from constitutional Erie, because states simply lack power to make
other states’ laws.118 Authority over the question of who can claim rights
under New York law is given to the courts and legislature of New York and
withheld from other states, just as clearly as authority over everyday torts
and contracts was given to the states and withheld from the federal
government in Erie. The principle also follows from Erie’s assertions about
the authority of state courts that the laws of the states are what their courts
say they are, not what someone else might think is desirable.119 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has recognized this principle, deriving it from the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.120 The conclusion that follows is that state courts are
constitutionally bound to respect sister-state choice-of-law rules to the
extent that they define the scope of state law. To the extent this conclusion
is not honored—to the extent that one state asserts the authority to define
the scope of another’s law—our choice-of-law system continues the error of
Swift v. Tyson.
Perhaps surprisingly, choice of law is still waiting for its Erie. The
Supreme Court has never said that states’ rules about the scope of their law
are binding—not when they take the form of choice-of-law rules121—and
state courts regularly ignore sister-state choice-of-law rules. No one can say
with confidence why this is so, but I have some guesses. First, much like
the federal courts during the Swift era, the state courts engaging in this
practice likely do not realize they are violating the principle of Erie. Swiftera federal courts, remember, did not think that they were independent of
state courts on certain questions of state law; they thought that the general
law was not state law. Just so, state courts today presumably do not think
they are independent authorities on the meaning of sister-state law, at least
not if it is clearly established and brought to their attention.122 They simply
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Because of the complete lack of lawmaking power, the constitutional argument for this
application of horizontal Erie is actually stronger than the constitutional argument for Klaxon, where
Congress has power over choice of law but has not exercised it.
119
See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
120
See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730–31 (1988); see also Shady Grove Orthopedic
Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1443 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“New York has no
power to alter substantive rights and duties created by other sovereigns.”).
121
If they take the form of statutory specifications, by contrast, sister-state disregard violates the
Full Faith and Credit Clause.
122
See Wortman, 486 U.S. at 730–31.
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do not think of choice-of-law analysis in terms of scope and priority; rather,
they most likely understand it as some sort of metaprocedure.123
I have argued that this understanding is unsound, but its appeal is
understandable given that the alternative seems impossible. The second
factor at work is that if we do suppose that a state’s choice-of-law rules are
part of its law—so that we must apply them whenever we apply that state’s
law—we run into all the problems choice of law puts under the name of
renvoi.124 In particular, if two states’ choice-of-law rules each point to the
other, it seems simply impossible to decide the case.
However, this perception is a result of failing to use the two-step
model. Once we separate choice of law into the two issues of scope and
priority, it becomes clear that a system whereby each state is authoritative
with respect to the scope of its own law but not with respect to that law’s
relative priority is indeed possible.
Changing the facts of the earlier hypothetical will allow us to see this.
Suppose, as we did in the discussion of Klaxon, that Kansas follows a
territorial approach to choice of law while Iowa has adopted the Second
Restatement. But reverse the facts by supposing that a married couple from
Kansas gets into an accident in Iowa. Now the Kansas choice-of-law rule—
territoriality—points to Iowa law on the issue of interspousal tort immunity.
But the Iowa choice-of-law rule—most significant relationship—points to
the law of shared domicile, Kansas. If we say that states are obliged to heed
each other’s choice-of-law rules, we seem to have created the dread infinite
cycle; an endless ping-pong back and forth.
But we have not. The first step of the two-step model is to think about
the scope of the states’ laws. Kansas has decided that its law is territorial.
Well and good for Kansas; its law creates no rights related to an accident in
Iowa. What about Iowa’s law? To determine the scope of Iowa law, we
look to the Iowa court. Iowa, following the Second Restatement, gives its
law maximum scope, so it does create rights related to this accident. Scope
analysis handles this hypothetical by itself, just as it does Erie: the case
must be decided under Iowa law because that is the only law that reaches
the facts, and there is thus no need for a priority determination.
Why did the scope analysis avoid the paradox that conventional
choice-of-law thinking generated? Because a state following the
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This view is pretty clearly mistaken, I have suggested, because choice-of-law rules do obviously
set the scope of state law in just the same way as explicit statutory limits. See supra text accompanying
notes 99–104. The Supreme Court, interpreting a federal statute, has also stated that a state’s choice-oflaw rules are part of its “law” and must be consulted to determine what rights that law gives. See
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962); see also Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex
Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 568–70 (1996) (arguing that choice-of-law rules are substantive).
124
Literally, “renvoi” means a sending-back or remission. Kramer, supra note 55, at 979–80. In
choice of law, it is used to refer generally to the question of what effect one state should give to the
choice-of-law rules of another.
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conventional thinking will use its choice-of-law approach not only to
determine the scope of its own law (which is within its power) but also to
determine the scope of other states’ laws (which is not). What happened in
the conventional choice-of-law analysis above was that Iowa mistakenly
deemed Kansas law to be as expansive as its own.125 That is what allowed
Iowa to conclude that Kansas law should be applied in preference to Iowa
law even though, according to Kansas courts, Kansas law does not reach the
facts of the case.
Accepting that a state’s choice-of-law rules are in part about the scope
of its law, and hence in part subject to the exclusive authority of that state,
would be a relatively significant conceptual change in the conventional
approach to choice of law.126 Its practical consequences, however, would be
ones that the modern approaches have been moving toward. The Second
Restatement, though still puzzled by renvoi, has recognized that another
state’s choice-of-law rules can provide useful information about whether
that state seeks to regulate a transaction.127 My analysis narrows this point to
the question of scope and sharpens it to a constitutional command, but the
import is much the same.
The change that would come from accepting the two-step model, in
fact, would be exactly the same kind as that worked by Erie: once we
realize that a particular legal question (the scope of state law) is within the
authority of that state and no one else, the independence that other courts
have asserted on that question looks like an unconstitutional usurpation of
authority. But just as Erie had policy support in addition to its constitutional
grounds, this suggestion does too. On questions of scope, it will produce
uniformity not just within a state (i.e., in state and federal courts) but among
different states. It will also, as suggested above, eliminate the vexing
problem of renvoi, which simply never arises in the two-step analysis.
B. Van Dusen, Ferens, and Characterization
One of the most notorious oddities of choice of law is the situation that
results when a case filed under the diversity jurisdiction of a federal court in
one state is transferred to a district court in another state pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a).128 How should the principles of Erie and Klaxon apply
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Kansas also mistakenly deemed Iowa law territorial, but this error was of no real consequence.
See Roosevelt, Renvoi, supra note 6, at 1887–90.
127
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8 cmt. k (1971).
128
Section 1404(a) allows federal district courts to transfer cases to another district in which they
might have been brought “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006).
126
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here? In two cases, the Supreme Court articulated an approach that has left
commentators scratching their heads.129
In Van Dusen v. Barrack, the Court decided that a defendant’s transfer
under § 1404(a) should produce “but a change of courtrooms,” and not a
change of law.130 For a case filed in federal district court in Pennsylvania
and then transferred to the district of Massachusetts at the defendant’s
request (the situation in Van Dusen), the Supreme Court stated that the
federal court in Massachusetts should apply the same law that the court in
Pennsylvania would have applied—namely, Pennsylvania choice-of-law
rules and whatever substantive law they selected. As the Court put it,
“[T]he critical identity to be maintained is between the federal district court
which decides the case and the courts of the State in which the action was
filed.”131
Thus far, the result may seem reasonable enough. Under Erie, the
federal court in Massachusetts would have to try to achieve substantial
uniformity with the courts of some state, and sticking to the state where the
action was initially filed makes a fair amount of sense. Most obviously, it
protects the plaintiff’s choice of law, if not forum, by preventing the
defendant from using § 1404(a) to change the rules as well as the playing
field.
Twenty-six years later, however, an odder consequence emerged. In
Ferens v. John Deere Co., the plaintiff, a Pennsylvania resident, was
injured in Pennsylvania by a combine manufactured by a Delaware
corporation.132 Clearly, this gave him a tort claim under Pennsylvania law,
but that law also provided a two-year limitations period for torts, and Ferens
did not file his suit until three years after the accident.133 In Pennsylvania
state court his tort claim would have been untimely, and a federal court in
Pennsylvania would also have applied the Pennsylvania limitations period
and dismissed because limitations periods are substantive for Erie purposes.
So Ferens brought his Pennsylvania tort claims in federal court in
Mississippi, where the limitations period was six years.134 Crucially, the
limitations period was considered procedural for choice-of-law purposes by
the Mississippi courts, meaning that a Mississippi state court would apply
the Mississippi limit and not the Pennsylvania limit, even though
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See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Has the Erie Doctrine Been Repealed by Congress?, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 1629, 1635 (2008) (stating that Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990), is a “bizarre
result” with a “surreal quality”).
130
376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964).
131
Id.
132
494 U.S. 516, 519 (1990). His wife also sued, see id., but for simplicity I will refer to the
plaintiff as Ferens in the singular.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 519–20.
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Pennsylvania law provided the underlying substantive rights.135 Following
Klaxon, the federal district court in Mississippi applied the same choice-oflaw analysis a Mississippi court would and dutifully deemed the tort claim
timely. Thereupon the plaintiff moved to transfer the case under § 1404(a)
and the proceedings moved to the Western District of Pennsylvania.136
Van Dusen made clear that a defendant who moved for a transfer could
obtain a change of venue but not a change of law. Not so for plaintiffs, said
the district court in Ferens. Without “some measure of good faith
expectation of proceeding in the court in which the complaint is filed” the
filing in Mississippi was “merely a procedural ploy” that should not allow
Ferens to pick up the longer limitations period en route to Pennsylvania.137
The Third Circuit affirmed, initially on the alternate ground that application
of the Mississippi limitations period would violate the Constitution, but
ultimately on the same theory.138
The Supreme Court reversed.139 The five-Justice majority said that
denying Ferens the ability to rely on the Mississippi limitations period
would simply encourage him to continue to litigate in Mississippi, which
was obviously a less convenient forum.140 True, he had sought out that
forum, and allowing him to take its limitations period with him to
Pennsylvania rewarded his procedural manipulations. But the burden of
litigating in Mississippi did not fall on the plaintiff alone, and “[t]he desire
to take a punitive view of the plaintiff’s actions should not obscure the
systemic costs of litigating in an inconvenient place.”141
It may be true, as the Court suggested, that the systemic costs of a
different rule would be greater if plaintiffs simply litigated entire cases in
inconvenient forums in order to preserve favorable law. All the same, the
result in Ferens is surprising. We are used to the idea that plaintiffs go to a
forum in order to get its law, but we are less used to the idea that they can
order it for takeout. The end result—that Ferens can litigate in Pennsylvania
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Id.
Id. at 520.
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Ferens v. Deere & Co., 639 F. Supp. 1484, 1491 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
138
The first Third Circuit decision, Ferens v. Deere & Co., 819 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1987), was
vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court, Ferens v. Deere & Co., 487 U.S. 1212, 1212–13 (1988)
(mem.), in light of Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988), which held that a state with no
connection to underlying litigation could nonetheless apply its own procedural rules, including
limitations periods. Sun Oil Co., 486 U.S. at 722. On remand, the Third Circuit focused on the forumshopping issue and held that Pennsylvania law should control the issue of timeliness. Ferens v. Deere &
Co., 862 F.2d. 31, 35–36 (3d Cir. 1988).
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Ferens, 494 U.S. at 533.
140
Id. at 531.
141
Id. at 530. But see id. at 537 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that these costs could be reduced
by district judges transferring cases sua sponte, and that the Van Dusen rule need not apply to such
transfers).
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while retaining a limitations period plucked from Mississippi law—seems
quite inconsistent with the policy-Erie goal of substantial uniformity.142
Admittedly, this oddity is not due entirely to the Court’s rule. If
Mississippi characterized limitations periods as substantive, or if it required
plaintiffs relying on claims under foreign law to meet the corresponding
foreign limitations period, as most states do,143 Ferens’s procedural ploy
would not have worked. Still, the outcome is strange enough that it might
be worth asking whether we can do better. Apart from adopting the dissent
and saying that plaintiff-initiated transfers should get transferee law, is there
another way of looking at the case?
Again, I think that viewing the matter from the two-step perspective
will help. The first step is to determine the scope of state law, to ask which
states’ laws create rights. Pennsylvania law gives Ferens a tort claim, but it
also gives Deere a defense: the two-year limitations period. Mississippi also
gives Ferens a right. Because its limitations period runs for six years, it
gives him a right to sue until that time has elapsed.
Does the Mississippi right to sue conflict with the Pennsylvania
defense? Not necessarily. It might be the case that these rights are good
only in certain courts. Unambiguously procedural rights, like the right to
use a certain number of pages in a brief or to take a certain number of days
to file a response, are plainly intended only to apply in the courts of the
forum.144 Pennsylvania law might allow Ferens fifty pages, and Mississippi
law only forty, but there is no conflict between them. He has the right to
fifty pages in a Pennsylvania court and forty in a Mississippi court, and
neither state intends to confer a right in the courts of the other.
With respect to limitations periods, however, there probably is a
conflict. The purpose of the Pennsylvania two-year limit is presumably in
part to regulate Pennsylvania courts. From this perspective, it is intended to
allocate Pennsylvania judicial resources to the litigation of fresh rather than
stale claims, and it reflects an assessment of how quickly tort claims can
and should be brought.145 If that were the only purpose, we would not
expect defendants to be able to raise it in the courts of other states. But it is
also presumably intended to give defendants peace of mind after it has
elapsed—it is intended to shield them from liability. This defendant-
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In dissent, Justice Scalia said the file-and-transfer stratagem “reduced to a laughingstock” the
Erie–Klaxon policy. Id. at 536; see also Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum
on Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1147, 1188–89
(2006) (arguing that the slippery slope of Van Dusen and its progeny, including Ferens, “leaves one
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See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 550 (2006).
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See supra text accompanying notes 63–64.
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It presumably reflects an assessment of how quickly such claims go stale given the usual
methods of proof, how important they are compared to the other claims competing for judicial attention,
how much time plaintiffs need to prepare before filing, and other similar considerations.
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protective purpose is at stake no matter where litigation takes place, so it is
reasonable to suppose that Pennsylvania grants this defense to Deere even
in a Mississippi court.
Does Mississippi mean to give Ferens a right to sue in its courts? It is
hard to see what purpose doing so would serve. Mississippi has no obvious
procedural interest in holding its courts open to foreign litigants longer than
the courts of foreign states—this seems to consume judicial resources for no
gain.146 And it has no obvious interest as far as the parties are concerned,
either—Ferens was not a Mississippi resident, and nothing related to the
suit happened in Mississippi. But the Mississippi courts had decided that
their limitations period was intended to govern actions like this. The scope
of state law, Erie tells us, is what state courts say it is, not what someone
else would think is wise.147 So Mississippi law does give Ferens a right, and
it conflicts with Deere’s defense under Pennsylvania law.
Because there is a conflict between rights, we have to move to the
second step: deciding which state’s law will get priority. Here, the
arguments for Pennsylvania law seem quite strong. Pennsylvania law
creates the cause of action; surely Pennsylvania should be entitled to
determine when that cause of action ceases to exist, especially given that
neither party is from Mississippi and the accident occurred in Pennsylvania.
But Mississippi has decided that its limitation period should prevail, so that
will be the result in a Mississippi court.
Why is that? The forum interest in following its own rules of procedure
on questions such as the page limit for briefs is obvious: it is convenient for
the court to use a single uniform set of procedural rules to govern all
litigation, and the particular rules the state has chosen for its courts reflect
its views on, for instance, how many pages parties should be given to make
their case. But this kind of interest does not exist in Ferens—there is no
146
Conceivably, Mississippi could aspire to become a magnet for litigation, which might serve the
interest of the plaintiffs’ bar. But it seems more likely that it simply adhered without much thought to
the traditional choice-of-law characterization of limitations periods as procedural.
147
There are, of course, constitutional limits on the scope of state law, and one could argue that
they were exceeded in Ferens. If Mississippi claimed to be providing a cause of action under its own tort
law, the response would be that it was constitutionally impermissible because Mississippi lacks
sufficient contacts with the case. In Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., the Supreme Court
observed, “We cannot give [a cause of action] longer life in the federal court than it would have had in
the state court without adding something to the cause of action. We may not do that consistently with
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.” 337 U.S. 530, 533–34 (1949). Why does Mississippi have the power to add to
the Pennsylvania cause of action?
The answer, such as it is, is that the Supreme Court has said it can. In Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486
U.S. 717 (1988), the Court held that a forum may apply its own longer limitations period to a claim
based on foreign law, even when it has no contacts with the underlying litigation, if the forum deems
limitations periods procedural. Id. at 728–29. One might, however, argue that a limitations period is
substantive in the Byrd sense—that it is part of the state-created definition of the right. In that instance,
an unrelated forum should not have the power to sever it from the foreign cause of action, or to provide
that a conflicting longer forum limitations period prevails. Sun Oil does not address this argument.
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interest of Mississippi courts that is served by hearing a case that could not
be brought in Pennsylvania.148
In fact, the Mississippi courts offer no reason—it is simply that they
characterize the limitations period as procedural and therefore governed by
forum law.149 So one thing the two-step perspective reveals is that this
determination of priority is what is actually at stake in a substance–
procedure characterization, at least sometimes. Calling something
procedural in a choice-of-law analysis is shorthand for the determination
that it should be controlled by forum law rather than the foreign law that
creates the cause of action.150 This determination may be relatively
uncontroversial—if the forum and the foreign state agree that the issue is
procedural, as they do for page limits, then only forum law purports to
apply and, as in Erie, only one state’s law reaches the facts. No question of
priority arises. But if the forum deems an issue procedural while the foreign
law considers it substantive, there is a conflict between the two laws, each
of which is intended to apply. The forum may be entitled to decide the issue
under its own law, but we should not lose sight of the fact that it has done
so by giving priority to forum law and subordinating foreign law.151
So Mississippi has made a decision to give its law priority over
Pennsylvania’s law. It is an odd decision, based apparently more on
traditional line drawing than any sensible assessment of state interests, but
it is one the Supreme Court has said is constitutionally permissible. In a
Mississippi state court, Ferens will not be time-barred. Must a federal court
in Mississippi reproduce this odd result, with the further consequence that
Ferens can transfer the case to Pennsylvania and bring the Mississippi
limitations period with him?
I think the answer is no. Mississippi has made a decision to give its law
priority over Pennsylvania’s; this is the point that the two-step perspective
on substance and procedure revealed. But according to the reading of
Klaxon set forth above, there is no constitutional requirement for a federal
court to follow a state’s rules of priority. Nor are the policy-Erie
considerations particularly weighty.
Policy Erie has two basic concerns: forum shopping and, as a
consequence, arbitrary discrimination. The forum-shopping concern is that
the availability of a different result in federal court will lead parties to

148
By contrast, dismissing a case that could be brought in Pennsylvania might serve an interest of
Mississippi courts—that of allocating judicial resources to fresh rather than stale claims.
149
See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor Machinery, Inc., 529 So. 2d 606, 609 (Miss. 1988) (“Mississippi
has always considered statutes of limitation procedural . . . .”).
150
It also suggests that the rights created should be limited to the forum’s courts.
151
One way of seeing this is to consider the interaction between state and federal law, where the
Supremacy Clause forbids states from giving their law priority. In obedience to that clause, states
consistently use federal limitations periods for federal rights. See Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie,
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 30 & n.137 (2006).
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choose that forum, and choosing a forum for strategic reasons is generally
considered undesirable.152 The broader concern about arbitrariness is that
the availability of the federal forum because of diversity will arbitrarily
favor parties who want the federal outcome, while similarly situated
litigants in cases where diversity does not exist cannot obtain it.
First, as to cases like Ferens itself, forum shopping is probably not
undesirable. Suppose that the federal court adopts a different rule of priority
and decides that on these facts the Pennsylvania defense should prevail.
Deere can remove to federal court if sued in Mississippi state court, and it
will win on limitations grounds. But that is not a problem, because the
result in federal court is not simply different; it is better: the reason the
federal court has adopted a different rule of priority is that Mississippi is
unreasonably discriminating against foreign law. Protecting individuals
from that kind of discrimination is one of the purposes of diversity
jurisdiction.153
Second, the more general problem of arbitrariness does not exist in the
same way it did under the Swift regime. Arbitrariness existed under Swift
because the federal forum (and hence the federal view of the general law)
was available on a basis (diversity of citizenship) that had nothing to do
with whether the federal or state view should control. The federal version of
the general law was available not only in multistate cases where the state
forum was disrespecting foreign law, but in all cases, even a purely
intrastate tort (as in Erie), as long as the parties were diverse.
In Ferens, however—as in any case in which the federal veto over state
rules of priority would be invoked—the foreign citizenship is quite relevant.
A federal court departing from the Mississippi rule and giving priority to
Pennsylvania law would be doing so because Pennsylvania’s connections
with the case are so much stronger than Mississippi’s that Mississippi’s
assertion of priority is unreasonable. This approach would sacrifice some
uniformity: the federal rule of priority would not be available in a suit
between two Mississippi residents with respect to a Pennsylvania tort
because that suit would not generate federal diversity jurisdiction. But that
suit would also look quite different in terms of the reasonableness of
Mississippi’s claim of priority. That claim would not be unreasonable
because Mississippi would be the state of both parties’ domicile and so the
different outcome would not be a troubling disuniformity.154
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For a more detailed analysis of forum shopping, see Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 313–14 (1990).
153
See Laycock, supra note 89.
154
The federal forum would also not be available in a suit between two Pennsylvania residents
about a Pennsylvania tort, and the disuniformity between that suit and one of a Pennsylvania citizen
versus a Delaware citizen (such as Ferens) is more troubling. But a Mississippi court in the
Pennsylvanian-versus-Pennsylvanian case would most likely dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds.
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What does all of this mean? The problem in Ferens, as I intimated
earlier, is not really that a plaintiff-initiated transfer under § 1404(a)
preserves the law obtained by the initial choice of forum. It is more that
Mississippi, by characterizing limitations periods as procedural, claims
priority for its longer period as against shorter periods under foreign law,
even when foreign law creates the underlying rights. The two-step model
shows us that this priority determination is really at stake in substance–
procedure characterization; it gives us a clearer understanding of the
problem.
It also shows us the solution, through its interpretation of Klaxon. A
federal court that follows state rules of scope but departs from unreasonable
rules of priority can correct unreasonable discrimination against foreign
law. That is a more appropriate outcome than for it to “play the rule [sic] of
ventriloquist’s dummy” to the Mississippi state courts.155
C. Erie’s Progeny: Why the Source of Federal Law Matters
The two-step model gives us both a deeper understanding of what is
troubling about the Ferens result and a way to avoid it. The real problem is
Mississippi’s unreasonable assertion of priority for its limitations period,
and an independent federal determination of priority provides an
appropriately limited cure. Additionally, its perspective on substance–
procedure characterization is of use in other cases. I argued above that when
this characterization is at issue under state law, federal courts should
understand that characterizing an issue as procedural amounts to placing it
within the scope of forum law and giving that law priority, a decision that
may not always be reasonable and can be disregarded in appropriate cases.
But what about when we are dealing not with choice-of-law
characterization, but instead with Erie analysis? Here, too, I will argue,
seeing the substance–procedure characterization in terms of scope and
priority will clarify matters.
Erie’s progeny start out conceptualizing the issue in terms of an
abstract dichotomy between substance and procedure.156 But they quickly
abandon formalistic line drawing of the sort used by the Mississippi courts
in Ferens in favor of a more practical approach.157 In Guaranty Trust, the
Court adopted what has been called the outcome-determinativeness test: in
order to promote policy Erie, it decided, it would class as substantive any
rule that might “determine the outcome of a litigation.”158
155

Richardson v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942).
See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (“The test must be whether a rule really
regulates procedure,—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law
and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.”).
157
The idea that a sharp and meaningful line separates these two categories of law is now generally
rejected. For a discussion of the relation of the two, see Main, supra note 66, at 812–18.
158
326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
156
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But even drawing a substance–procedure line in terms of outcomedeterminativeness will not resolve all the Erie problems—not unless
outcome-determinativeness marks the outer limit of federal procedural
lawmaking power, which it does not.159 Federal procedure can overlap with
state outcome-determinative law; it can even overlap with state law that is
truly substantive. A state might, for instance, create a cause of action with
statutory damages but then, in order to prevent annihilative liability,
provide that those damages are not available in class actions. That is a
substantive purpose—it is a limit on the claim that is intended to operate in
any forum—but it overlaps with federal procedural rules about the
certification of class actions in federal court.160 It is these overlaps that make
Erie analysis so complicated and confusing.
Once again, I suggest, the two-step model offers a better way. From
that perspective, the key Erie questions are simply those of scope and
priority. Does state law grant rights to the parties, even in a federal court?
(This question should be answered by inquiring into the state law’s purpose
and asking whether that purpose will be promoted by its application in
federal court.) Does federal law grant contrary rights? If so, which should
prevail? (Federal law will prevail if the federal government wishes it to, but
it might decide, for policy-Erie reasons, to yield or incorporate.) These
questions may be hard to answer in some cases, but they are the right ones
to ask. Next we will apply this understanding to some difficult Erie puzzles.
1. Statutes and the Constitution vs. Judge-Made Law.—Thinking
about Erie in terms of scope and priority allows us to make sense of
perhaps the most puzzling wrinkle that has arisen in the doctrine: the
differential treatment of federal law depending on its source. If the federal
law at issue in an Erie analysis is the Constitution, a statute, or a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure, it will be given effect as written. But when the
federal law is judge made, the outcome is far less certain. In Walker v.
Armco Steel Corp.,161 for instance, and more recently in Gasperini v. Center
for Humanities, Inc.,162 federal law made by judges to fill gaps in the Rules
either gave way (as in Walker) or melded with state law (as in Gasperini).
Whatever one thinks of the precise result the Court selected (Gasperini
in particular has drawn its share of criticism163), the pattern is undeniable:
159

See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469–72 (1965).
I describe here roughly the facts of Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Insurance
Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010), which I discuss in more detail infra Part III.E.
161
446 U.S. 740 (1980).
162
518 U.S. 415 (1996).
163
See, e.g., Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal Rules: An Essay on
What’s Wrong with the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707, 707–18 (2006) (calling Gasperini
puzzling); C. Douglas Floyd, Erie Awry: A Comment on Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,
1997 BYU L. REV. 267, 271 (“[N]o careful reading of the Court’s previous decisions or of the policies
underlying Erie and the Rules of Decision Act could justify the bifurcated approach . . . adopted by the
160
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judge-made law gets treated differently. But why? Federal common law, in
the post-Erie world, is real federal law.164 It creates federal question
jurisdiction and it can preempt state law just like a federal statute or the
Constitution.165 Why should it be more yielding in Erie analysis?
The two-step model provides the answer. A court’s task, on this model,
is to determine the scope of the two competing laws and assign one priority
if necessary. The Constitution itself asserts its priority in the Supremacy
Clause, so if the case falls within its scope—if it creates rights or
obligations—it must be given priority.166 So too for federal statutes, which
the Supremacy Clause includes in its list of supreme law: they will always
take priority over state law, unless Congress directs otherwise.167 The
qualification is important: the Supremacy Clause gives federal lawmakers
the power to preempt state law, but of course they can always decline to do
so, as Congress occasionally has.168 Federal judge-made law differs from
statutes not in terms of its potential preemptive force, but with respect to
this decision as to whether or not to assert priority. With statutes, judges
apply the law but do not make it. Thus, on the issue of priority vis-à-vis
state law, they must simply enforce the decision Congress has already
made. With judge-made law, however, they make the law and are free to
make the priority decision on their own.169 This judicial discretion is
presumably what the Hanna court had in mind when it referred to “the
typical, relatively unguided Erie choice” as distinguished from the situation
where “the court has been instructed” what to do.170 Without legislative
guidance, the priority determination is a policy decision, and unsurprisingly
judges have been guided by policy Erie in deciding the extent to which their

majority in Gasperini.”); Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie after Gasperini, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 1637, 1641 (1998) (“Although the Court’s conclusions are reasonable, the road to them is not
well lighted.”); Hazard, supra note 129, at 1635 (calling Gasperini “a pitiful attempt”).
164
See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the ew Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 383, 405 (1964).
165
See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98–100 (1972) (“[Section] 1331
jurisdiction will support claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory
origin.”); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 424–27 (1964) (holding that the federal
common law act of state doctrine has preemptive force).
166
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
167
Id.
168
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006) (disclaiming preemption of state insurance regulation).
169
More precisely, this is true of courts the first time they confront the issue, which is when they
engage in the lawmaking. In subsequent cases, the law and the decision as to its priority have been
made, and they will presumably follow the earlier decision either as a matter of stare decisis (if it is the
same court) or binding precedent if a higher court has rendered a decision. Cases like Walker and
Gasperini are examples of the Supreme Court’s first encounter with the question of the priority of a
particular judge-made rule vis-à-vis state law.
170
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). Congress has indeed given the Court guidance as to
how to apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but I will suggest below that the Court may have
misunderstood that guidance. See infra Part III.C.2.
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judge-made rules should displace otherwise-applicable state law. That is
exactly the reasoning we see in Walker and Gasperini.171
2.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and State Substantive
Law.—And what about the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? The
Court, as noted above, has treated them essentially like statutes, and most
commentators have too: if a valid Federal Rule is on point, it must be given
effect.172 A Rule is valid if the matter it regulates is “arguably
procedural.”173 Hence any Rule that regulates an arguably procedural matter
will displace contrary state law, regardless of whether the state law would
be deemed substantive.174 And as a practical matter, first-year students
learn, you can be pretty confident that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is
at least arguably procedural; not one has ever been struck down on the
grounds that it strayed impermissibly into substance.175 As the Court put it
in Hanna v. Plumer, when a Federal Rule is on point, “the court has been
instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the
Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie
judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the
Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.”176
But this is a strange approach, as John Hart Ely and others have noted,
because it seems to neglect a clearly significant provision of the Rules
Enabling Act. The “arguably procedural” limit comes from 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072(a), which gives the Court power to make rules on procedural matters
but does not mention substantive law.177 The following Section, however,
adds another limit: the Rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right.”178 This looks like a different kind of restriction. As Ely
puts it, “The Act therefore contains . . . limitations of both the checklist and
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See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 430–31 (1996) (discussing Erie’s
“twin aims”); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752–53 (1980) (noting that policy Erie seeks
to prevent forum shopping).
172
See, e.g., Clark, supra note 38 at 1311 (“[W]hen Congress . . . adopts a federal rule on
point . . . the only question for the judiciary is whether the particular rule falls within Congress’s
constitutional power to enact. If so, the Supremacy Clause instructs courts to follow the federal rule
notwithstanding contrary state law, whether characterized as ‘substantive’ or ‘procedural.’” (footnote
omitted)).
173
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal quotation mark omitted).
174
Id. at 472 (majority opinion).
175
Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 163, at 739.
176
380 U.S. at 471.
177
28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules
of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including
proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.”).
178
Id. § 2072(b).
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enclave variety.”179 Not only is the Court’s power limited in scope to
procedural matters (the checklist), but within that scope, certain areas are
carved out (the enclave)—subsection (b) says that even procedural rules are
not to affect substantive rights.
Why should this language be ignored? One answer might be that the
“arguably procedural” test actually incorporates the requirements of
subsection (b) as well as those of subsection (a).180 If a Rule is procedural,
this argument goes, then ipso facto it will not modify substantive rights;
subsection (b) is mere surplusage. This argument would be sound if
substance and procedure were mutually exclusive, nonoverlapping
categories into which rules could be placed by abstract, context-independent
analysis. But they are not; that view is exactly what sophisticated legal
minds have been rejecting since at least the 1930s.181 And given that federal
procedural law can in fact overlap with state substantive law,182 the
“arguably procedural” test works only to ensure that the rule falls within the
“checklist” restriction of authority to procedural matters. As to the
“enclave” restriction, Hanna’s invocation of the Advisory Committee,
Congress, and the Court begs the question. None of those entities is in a
position to decide whether applying the rule in a particular case will modify
a substantive right, for the obvious reason that they have no way to foresee
that case.
Another possibility is that whatever benefits the first sentence of
subsection (b) grant to state law are undone by the next sentence, which
provides that “[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further
force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”183 But this sentence is
179

Ely, supra note 37, at 719. By “checklist” limitation, Ely means the grant of a limited power
akin to the enumerated powers of Congress. By “enclave,” he means something carved out from within a
limited power.
180
See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1108
(1982). Burbank suggests that since Erie was still four years away, federalism was not on the drafters’
minds. Id. at 1109–10. But the revolution of 1935, with its acceptance of vastly greater federal power,
was also a year away, and constitutional “enclave” federalism still had vitality. See Ely, supra note 37,
at 701–02. Given that the Court was protecting state enclaves against congressional legislation,
subsection (b) might have been understood to reaffirm the existence of similar enclaves against Court
rulemaking. Burbank quotes the drafter’s transmission letter as describing it as reaffirming that
“Congress could not if it wanted to, confer upon the Supreme Court, legislative power,” which seems
consistent with this reading. See Burbank, supra, at 1073 & n.260 (quoting Letter from the Hon. Albert
B. Cummins to the Hon. William H. Taft (Dec. 17, 1923) (internal quotation marks omitted).
181
See Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J.
333, 334–35 (1933); Main, supra note 66. The drafters of the Rules Enabling Act may have subscribed
to this dichotomy, but that does not necessarily mean that we must try to adhere to a conceptual structure
that no longer fits the facts as we see them. It is also faithful interpretation to make sense of the statutory
language while recognizing that certain presuppositions of the drafters have proved false. See generally
Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 1785 (1997) (discussing the effects of changed context on interpretation).
182
See supra text accompanying notes 159–60.
183
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
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most naturally read to be not about the interaction of the Rules with state
law but instead about their interaction with federal laws. It affirms, as might
otherwise not be clear, that valid Rules can displace prior inconsistent
federal statutes—unlike, say, agency regulations, which cannot.184 But it
cannot easily be read to be about preempting state law, because Congress
surely did not intend the Rules to preempt state laws in state court, which
would be the consequence of rendering them “of no further force or effect.”
The most likely answer is instead that taking subsection (b) at face
value seems to eviscerate the Rules,185 or at least to place them at the mercy
of even a single state. If a Rule that modifies a substantive right is invalid,
then it seems that a single state could void a Rule by enacting a substantive
law in conflict with it—void the Rule, that is, in the sense that it could not
be applied even in states without such conflicting laws, or in federal
question cases. That result is surely intolerable, but it seems to be the
consequence of taking subsection (b) at face value. And because taking
subsection (b) seriously leads to such odd results, it is better to ignore it
entirely.
Or so people seem to think.186 But once again, the two-step perspective
shows that there is another alternative. We can read the Enabling Act’s
restriction as a statement about priority. The Federal Rules, the Act says on
this reading, should not be given priority if they conflict with “substantive”
law (which I would read as law intended to give rights regardless of forum).
This selective subordination of a rule is not at all the same thing as voiding
it entirely. The Rule would yield when faced with contrary substantive law.
But it would still have effect in federal question cases, and also in other
diversity cases where no state substantive right stood in its way.187
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Indeed, this is how the Supreme Court has read it. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10
(1941) (stating that the procedural rules that this Court promulgates, “if they are within the authority
granted by Congress, repeal” a prior inconsistent procedural statute).
185
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473–74 (1965) (“To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure must cease to function whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be
to disembowel either the Constitution’s grant of power over federal procedure or Congress’ attempt to
exercise that power in the Enabling Act.”).
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See, e.g., Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 163, at 738, 741 (describing the “central insight in
Hanna” as “that the validity of a federal rule should be determined as a general matter, not through caseby-case reconsideration of whether in a specific context it ‘abridge[d], enlarge[d] or modif[ied] any
substantive right’” and suggesting that if a challenge to a federal rule were to succeed, “the rule (or some
severable provision within it) would be held invalid in its entirety and the task of revising the rule and
narrowing its scope would be returned to the rulemaking process” (alterations in original) (quoting
§ 2072(b)).
187
This lack of uniformity would come at some cost in terms of judicial workload. See Shady
Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1447 (2010) (plurality opinion)
(arguing that case-specific analysis would be too costly). But it seems to be the most straightforward
reading of the text. In Shady Grove itself, five Justices seemed to endorse the independent significance
of the “shall not abridge” language, though they never formed a majority for this proposition. Id. at
1452–53 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 1463–64 & n.2 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
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This is in fact close to the result the Court has reached in those cases
where it has read a rule narrowly to avoid a conflict with state law, such as
Walker, and arguably Gasperini and Semtek as well. In those cases, “the
Court gave a Federal Rule an artificially narrow reading to avoid a conflict
with state law on state claims but preserved a literal reading of the rule for
federal claims.”188 Dudley and Rutherglen, like most other commentators,
suggest that this must be wrong—the decisions giving the Rule one
meaning in diversity actions and another in federal question ones “cannot
stand together.”189 But this simply fails to see the consequence of the twostep model. It is true that a Federal Rule should not be interpreted
differently in a diversity case than in a federal question case.190 But the Rule
might well have a different effect if in one case it encounters a state
substantive right and in the other it does not.191 Thus, thinking about the
significance of the source of federal law from the perspective of the twostep model offers several benefits. It explains why judge-made law is
different from statutory law for Erie analysis: because judges are
empowered to make the priority decision with respect to the former but not
the latter. It gives a clearer view of how to give meaning to the whole of the
Rules Enabling Act: give priority to state substantive law when it conflicts
with federal procedure. And it supports the Court’s practice of giving Rules
different effect in diversity cases and federal question cases: this can be
understood as giving priority to state substantive law as subsection (b) of
the Enabling Act directs, not as giving the Rules a different meaning.
D. The Class Action Fairness Act
Enacted in 2005, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)192
grants federal jurisdiction over, and hence allows removal of, class actions
where minimal diversity exists between the opposing parties and the
amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.193 Federal courts hearing such
cases must frequently deal with the interaction of choice of law and the
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Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 163, at 736.
Id. at 735–36.
190
See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980); Dudley & Rutherglen, supra
note 163, at 734–36.
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Consider by way of comparison a state law that in one case is the only potentially applicable law
and in another is preempted by federal law. Its effect in the two cases will certainly be different, but this
is not because the state law has been interpreted differently or means one thing in one case but
something different in the other.
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Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (2006)).
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28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006). Other subsections of § 1332 withdraw minor elements of this
grant. See, e.g., id. § 1332(d)(4)(B) (excluding classes in which at least two-thirds of plaintiffs and all
primary defendants are citizens of the state in which the action was filed).
189
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class action form.194 The primary significance of choice of law for class
actions is that courts often rely on choice-of-law analysis to decline to
certify a nationwide class. If different class members’ claims would be
governed by different states’ laws, courts frequently conclude that the suit
fails to meet the predominance requirement of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b): if multiple states’ laws will be used, common issues will
not predominate over individualized ones.195
How should federal courts deal with choice of law in the class action
setting? The most obvious answer is that they should do whatever state
courts would do, on the grounds that this is what Klaxon directs. There is, I
will suggest, considerable merit to this obvious response. But it is also
incomplete in some important respects, and to get a fuller answer we need
to think about the practice in state courts before CAFA and what its drafters
hoped to achieve.
We may conveniently start with the latter. CAFA’s “Findings and
Purposes” section opens with the statement that “[c]lass action lawsuits are
an important and valuable part of the legal system when they permit the fair
and efficient resolution of legitimate claims of numerous parties . . .”196 But
it is relatively clear that CAFA’s drafters came not to praise class actions
but to bury them. There follows a litany of complaints about alleged
“abuses of the class action device that have—(A) harmed class members
with legitimate claims and defendants that have acted responsibly; (B)
adversely affected interstate commerce; and (C) undermined public respect
for our judicial system.”197 In particular, subsection (a)(4) observes:
State and local courts are—(A) keeping cases of national importance out of
Federal court; (B) sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate bias against outof-State defendants; and (C) making judgments that impose their view of the
law on other States and bind the rights of the residents of those States.198

CAFA provides federal jurisdiction, the findings and purpose section
concludes, to “restore the intent of the framers of the United States
Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases
of national importance under diversity jurisdiction.”199
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See generally Silberman, supra note 90 (analyzing the role of choice of law in selecting a forum
to hear a class action and the effect of choice of law on interstate forum shopping in nationwide class
litigation).
195
See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir. 2002) (“No class
action is proper unless all litigants are governed by the same legal rules. Otherwise the class cannot
satisfy the commonality and superiority requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), (b)(3).”).
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Class Action Fairness Act § 2(a)(1).
197
Id. § 2(a)(2)(A)–(C).
198
Id. § 2(a)(4)(A)–(C).
199
Id. § 2(b)(2).
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To what extent were these concerns grounded in reality?200 It is true
that prior to CAFA, state courts did sometimes decide that a single state’s
law could govern a nationwide class action, while federal courts had grown
increasingly hostile to the practice.201 But to decide whether the state courts
were acting abusively, we need a more fine-grained analysis. In particular,
it is worth distinguishing between three possibilities.
First, if a Kansas court announces that it will decide a nationwide class
action under Kansas law when the only contact is that some plaintiffs are
from Kansas and were injured there—such that some other claims have
absolutely no connection to the state—it has clearly behaved badly.
Deciding that Kansas law will govern all the claims is an unconstitutional
power grab by Kansas, projecting its law into cases where it has no
authority. Second, if a Kansas court announces that it will decide a
nationwide class action under Nebraska law when the only contact is that
some plaintiffs are from Nebraska and were injured there, it is still behaving
badly. It is violating the Constitution by deciding claims that have no
connection to Nebraska under Nebraska law. The decision does not,
however, look like a power grab by Kansas;202 the problem is that Nebraska
law is arbitrary with respect to claims that have no contact to Nebraska.
Third and last, if a Kansas court announces that it will decide a nationwide
class action under Iowa law when Iowa is the defendant’s principal place of
business, or where the design or manufacture of a defective product took
place, the Kansas court is quite likely not behaving badly. It has not
violated the Constitution by deciding claims under the law of a state with no
connection to the underlying facts, and it has not made a grab for power by
unreasonably elevating its own law over that of other states.
To read CAFA’s findings, you would think that state-court certification
of nationwide classes followed the first of these three patterns—the
unconstitutional power grab. But in fact that sort of thing has not gone on
since the Supreme Court pronounced it unconstitutional in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.203 Instead, decisions announcing that all claims will
be subject to a single law uniformly follow the third pattern: they choose
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Stephen Burbank characterizes the findings and statement of purpose as either “window
dressing” or “bullshit.” Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of
Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1942 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Compare Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1015 (refusing to certify class on choice-of-law
grounds), with Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 81 P.3d 618, 627–29 (Okla. 2003) (certifying
nationwide class under Michigan law).
202
At least not in the sense of asserting priority for its law. If Kansas makes itself a magnet forum
for class actions, it has grabbed power in a different sense, which may be objectionable but is not the
focus of this Article.
203
472 U.S. 797, 821–22 (1985).
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the law of the defendant’s principal place of business or the state where the
defendant engaged in some relevant act.204
What is wrong with that? The main objection is that a court doing this
may be reaching a different choice-of-law result for a class action because it
is a class action, or engaging in what Richard Nagareda called
“bootstrapping.”205 That is, the court might decide that a single state’s law
should govern the entire action when, had the claims been brought
individually, it would have decided them under multiple different laws.206
On its face, this might seem bad. The principle that the procedural
device of the class action should not alter substantive rights has significant
intuitive appeal.207 In federal courts, it seems a plausible consequence of the
Rules Enabling Act’s admonition that the Federal Rules should not alter
substantive rights.208 And a state court that disregards it might fairly be
described as abusive if by so doing it deprives a defendant of the benefits of
law it could have asserted against an individual suit.
But matters are a little more complex than that. To understand how
choice of law works in a class action, we need to go back to the two-step
model. Suppose we are dealing with a multistate products liability case. The
defendant, operating in its principal place of business in Iowa, has
manufactured goods that are then shipped and sold nationwide, and cause
injuries in all of the states where they are purchased. And, for simplicity’s
sake, let us assume that the injured parties purchase the products and are
injured in their domiciliary states, and that choice of law is the only
possible obstacle to certification. Plaintiffs seek to certify a nationwide
class. How should this be analyzed?
The first step is to ask which states’ laws give the parties rights. Iowa
law probably gives the plaintiffs a cause of action. It is not constitutionally
required to do so, and statutory language or judicial construction might
indicate that it does not (the statute might, for instance, specify that it
applies “to all goods purchased in this state,” or courts might have so
construed it). But states typically do assert an interest in regulating the
behavior of their corporate domiciliaries, even when the immediate
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See, e.g., Ysbrand, 81 P.3d at 625–26 (law of defendant’s principal place of business); David
Marcus, Erie, the Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of Diversity
Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1283 (2007) (noting that when courts choose a single
state’s law to apply to all class members’ claims, it is usually the law of the defendant’s principal place
of business or the law of the state where a product was manufactured or designed).
205
See Richard A. Nagareda, Bootstrapping in Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act,
74 UMKC L. REV. 661, 661 (2006).
206
Id. at 661–62.
207
See Kramer, supra note 123, at 572 (“Stated this way, the point seems both obvious and
irrefutable.”).
208
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
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consequences of that behavior are felt out of state.209 (In products liability
cases, for instance, states might want to ensure that local companies that
follow good design and manufacture practices are not forced out of business
by competition from those that do not.) Likewise, Iowa will give the
defendant a defense—it presumably has an interest in seeing that the local
defendant is not subjected to any greater liability than local law deems
appropriate.
What about the plaintiffs’ home state laws? As the place of injury and
plaintiffs’ domicile, these states surely give the plaintiffs causes of action.
And again, correlatively, they will probably give the defendant a defense
against greater liability (I will discuss this issue in more detail later). This
first step of the two-step analysis lets us see clearly what is wrong with the
two unconstitutional practices mentioned above (the Kansas court deciding
all claims against an Iowa manufacturer under either Kansas or Nebraska
law). In each case, the court would be deciding some claims under laws that
do not, in fact, grant the plaintiffs any rights. (Neither Kansas nor Nebraska
law has anything to say, for instance, about a Kentucky plaintiff injured in
Kentucky by the Iowa manufacturer’s product.210)
So the first step of the two-step model can give us a better
understanding of why courts cannot do what the Supreme Court has already
forbidden—apply a single state’s law when some class members’ claims
have no connection to that state. To figure out what is permissible, we need
to move on to the second step. The court must decide whether these various
rights (the claims and defenses) conflict, and if so, which is to be given
priority. The class will be certifiable if the court decides that claims from a
single state (which must be Iowa, as that is the only state that gives claims
to all plaintiffs) should prevail over any defenses the defendant can assert.
The possible defenses are those created by the plaintiffs’ home laws.
Of course, the defendant can also invoke defenses from Iowa law, but
because that law creates the plaintiffs’ claims, those defenses do not create
any problem of disuniformity that would threaten class certification. Here
we need to distinguish two possibilities. A plaintiff’s home law (or a
particular aspect of that law) might be more plaintiff-friendly or it might be
more defendant-friendly. That is, it might grant the plaintiff rights beyond
what the Iowa law does (treble damages, say, or the availability of
punitives, or a lesser burden of proof), or it might grant the defendant
additional rights.

209
See, e.g., State ex rel. Corbin v. Pickrell, 667 P.2d 1304, 1312 (Ariz. 1983) (“Indeed, it would
appear that the state has a legitimate interest in redressing the wrongs committed from within Arizona.
There is a moral imperative to provide redress for those injured.”).
210
Interestingly, this constitutional problem is exactly the same problem that existed in Erie:
deciding a claim under a law that does not create rights or obligations. See supra text accompanying
note 49.
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In the former case, the two-step perspective tells us something very
important that the traditional view of choice of law obscures. When the
plaintiff’s home law is more plaintiff-friendly, there is in fact no choice-oflaw question presented. Such a plaintiff has a variety of rights that she
could assert, some under her home state’s law and some under Iowa law. As
master of her complaint, she is entitled to assert whichever ones she wants,
just as she would be entitled to choose to pursue a tort theory rather than a
contract one, or one of several different causes of action available. If she
wants to assert claims under Iowa law because that allows class
certification, rather than claims under her home state’s law, that is a
permissible choice—and it is more election of remedies than choice of law.
So if plaintiffs whose home state’s laws are more plaintiff-friendly
wish to assert claims under Iowa law in order to join a class action, choice
of law should be no obstacle.211 This is, as I said, an insight that the
conventional understanding of choice of law obscures because rather than
asking which rights the plaintiff wants to assert, it would simply try to
decide which state’s law applies.212 It is also an example of the choice-oflaw analysis coming out differently because of the class action device. If
these claims were litigated individually, plaintiffs with more favorable
home law would presumably want to pursue those claims rather than
proceed under Iowa law, and a court might find that the rights created by
the plaintiffs’ home laws should prevail. Thus, those claims would be
decided under the plaintiffs’ home laws if brought individually, but under
Iowa law in a class action. But, importantly, it is not an impermissible form
of bootstrapping: what has changed is not the court’s analysis of the scope
or priority of state-created rights, but rather the plaintiff’s litigation
strategy.
What about the other possibility, where the plaintiff’s home state’s law
is more favorable to the defendant? One might simply say that these
defenses are not available to the defendant. The plaintiff’s home state must
surely offer them so far as claims under its law are concerned. If, for
instance, the plaintiff seeks to recover under Kansas products liability law,
the defenses under that law must be available to an Iowa defendant
manufacturer—Kansas cannot withhold rights under its law simply because
a defendant hails from another state.213 But it is not obvious that Kansas is
required to give those defenses to an Iowa manufacturer in order to relieve
211

There are some slightly difficult questions here about whether joining a nationwide class and
forgoing their home-state law claims is in the best interest of these plaintiffs—after all, they might be
able to pursue a single-state class action. But these questions are actually relatively familiar from the
class action context—they are analogous to those posed by a subset of plaintiffs who have additional
claims that would be relinquished by joining the class. They are not choice-of-law questions.
212
I believe that framing the choice-of-law question this way—as “what law applies?”—is
responsible for a significant portion of the confusion attending the field of conflict of laws. See
Roosevelt, Renvoi, supra note 6, at 1887–88.
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See Roosevelt, Myth, supra note 6, at 2512.
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it of liability that Iowa law imposes. And because doing so would simply
disfavor an injured Kansas domiciliary, one might conclude that Kansas
policy would be to withhold those defenses.214 If so, there is no conflict of
rights here either, in which case certification of a class under the
defendant’s home law would be almost always appropriate.
However, that might not be the best interpretation of Kansas law. It
might also be the case that Kansas offers defendants various protections not
just to encourage companies to manufacture goods in Kansas (the obvious
reason for defendant-friendly products liability laws), but also to encourage
out-of-state companies to ship goods into Kansas. That purpose would be
served by granting the Kansas defenses to an Iowa manufacturer, and even
by granting them again against Iowa claims.
Then we would have what modern choice-of-law theorists call a true
conflict: each state’s law grants rights, the rights conflict, and the court
must give one priority. If the court decided that the Iowa law should get
priority, the class could still be certified and all claims could be decided
under Iowa law. If it decided that the plaintiff’s home state’s law should get
priority, plaintiffs from that state would not be able to join the class. And
this is where the possibility of questionable bootstrapping arises: in making
this priority decision, a court might change its analysis because the case was
brought as a class action. It might, that is, decide to give priority to Iowa
law for the class action even though it would have given priority to the
plaintiff’s home state law in an individual suit.215
Thus, we must consider CAFA’s effect on three possible scenarios:
•

•

•

214

The state court, not engaging in bootstrapping, would decline
to certify the class on the grounds that some claims should be
decided under the plaintiffs’ home laws—that is, it would
decide that the defenses given by those laws were available to
the defendant and should prevail over rights under Iowa law;
The state court, not engaging in bootstrapping, would certify
the class on the grounds that all claims should be decided
under Iowa law—that is, it would decide either that defenses
under the plaintiffs’ home laws were not available to the Iowa
defendant, or that Iowa rights should take priority;
The state court would certify the class because it engaged in
bootstrapping to decide that all claims should be governed by
Iowa law—that is, although in an individual case it would

See, e.g., Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1007 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing idea
that state has an interest in preventing recovery by a domiciliary as “pure fancy”).
215
Nagareda, supra note 205, at 672–75, argues persuasively that state courts tend to do this by
finding that the defendant’s principal place of business stands out as compared to the many other states
implicated in a class action—a line of reasoning obviously not available in individual cases.
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have given priority to the plaintiff’s home law, it would give
priority to Iowa law because the case is a class action.
How should these cases come out if removed to federal court under
CAFA? The first case is easy. It is also somewhat unlikely to make it to
federal court—if the state court will refuse to certify a class, and the
defendant can foresee that outcome, there is no reason to remove it. But if
such a case does wind up in federal court, the federal judge should follow
his state counterpart and also decline certification. The state court has
decided to give the plaintiffs’ home laws priority over Iowa law. I have
argued that federal courts are independent on priority questions, but for
policy-Erie reasons, they should usually follow state rules of priority.216
This situation provides no reason to depart from that general rule.
The second case, where the state court would certify without
bootstrapping, is a little more complicated. The immediate response might
be that this is a choice-of-law decision, and Klaxon tells federal courts
facing choice-of-law issues to follow the courts of the states in which they
sit—hence the federal court should also certify the class. But a more precise
analysis discloses several wrinkles. For one thing—and this is one of
CAFA’s very significant effects—it might be the case that statecertification requirements are more lenient than those of Rule 23.217 In some
substantial number of cases, classes that would have been certified under
state procedure will fail the more demanding test of Federal Rule 23.218
That is a significant effect, and it must be noted, but it is not a choiceof-law issue. So what about the choice-of-law based certifications? Should
the federal court follow the state court and certify the class on the grounds
that every claim can be decided under Iowa law?
There are, I said, two different ways the state court could have reached
this conclusion. First, it might decide that the defendant simply cannot
claim rights under the plaintiffs’ home law, because it believes that those
states do not intend to grant rights to such defendants. If this decision is
correct, then the federal court should also certify the class. This, again, is
the same kind of situation as Erie itself: Iowa law grants the plaintiffs a
cause of action and no other state’s law grants the defendant defenses, so
Iowa law is the only law under which the claims can be decided. But how
do we know that the decision is correct? The state court is not determining
the scope of its own law (on which it is authoritative); it is determining the
scope of other states’ laws. On that question it is not authoritative, and the
216

See supra text accompanying notes 97–109.
Under Arkansas law, for instance, courts are not required to perform a choice-of-law analysis
before certifying a nationwide class. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bryant, 285 S.W.3d 634, 641 (Ark.
2008).
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In Arkansas, for instance, any case that could not be certified because different class members’
claims will be governed by different laws will not be certified in federal court but will—assuming it
meets the other requirements—in state court.
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federal court might believe that the state court has made a mistake in its
construction of the other states’ policies. What should it do then?
There are policy-Erie reasons to follow the state court anyway, but
they are not as weighty as policy Erie usually is. In the ordinary case, the
policy-Erie point that offering a different result in federal court is unfairly
favorable to the out-of-stater who can invoke diversity jurisdiction is
supported by two considerations: the inherent unfairness of giving out-ofstaters the possibility of different results in federal court, and the lack of
any federal interest or other good reason for doing so. But in this case there
is a good reason: the federal court thinks that the state court has gotten
sister-state law wrong. Whether this reason should be weighty enough is
hard to say—it depends on how blatant the state court’s error is, and most
times the desire for uniformity will probably prevail. In some
circumstances, though, a mistaken construction of sister-state law might be
severe enough that it should not be followed in federal court.
The second reason that a state court might certify the hypothetical class
under Iowa law is that, without bootstrapping, it has decided that although
the rights created by Iowa law conflict with those created by the laws of the
plaintiffs’ home states, Iowa law should get priority. Should the federal
court follow this determination?
This is a relatively straightforward Klaxon question: should a federal
court follow state rules of priority? I’ve said already that while federal
courts are independent on questions of priority (which they are not on
questions of scope), policy Erie will ordinarily suggest that they should
follow their state counterparts. Exceptions might arise when a state is
unreasonably discriminatory in giving priority to its law over foreign law,
but that situation does not exist in this hypothetical. Most suits would
presumably be brought in states other than Iowa, so forum law would not
get priority, and even for suits brought in Iowa, the priority determination
would be reasonable. So in an ordinary diversity suit, the federal court
should follow the state court and certify the class.
Does CAFA change the analysis? Congress clearly has the power
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to tell federal courts to follow
different rules of priority.219 And in enacting CAFA, Congress did seem to
hope for some federal departures from state court practice.220 But in the text
of the statute, it identified the occasions for such departures very much in
terms of the unfair discrimination I have mentioned: state courts exhibiting
219

See, e.g., Gottesman, supra note 109, at 23 (“Scholars are virtually unanimous in their view that
Congress has the power to enact federal choice of law statutes.”).
220
The Senate Report on CAFA spoke disparagingly of state court decisions that certified
nationwide classes under a single law and noted approvingly federal court decisions that refused to do
so. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 23–27, 63–64 (2005) (“By enabling federal courts to hear more class
actions, this bill will help minimize the class action abuses taking place in state courts and ensure that
these cases can be litigated in a proper forum.”).
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“bias against out-of-state defendants” and “impos[ing] their view of the law
on other States.”221 Those seem like fairly clear references to certifying
classes under forum law and disregarding foreign defenses. Certifying
classes under the law of the defendant’s home state, especially when it is
the not the forum, does not seem to raise the problems Congress listed. So
CAFA should not make a difference here: if a state court, without
bootstrapping, would certify the class under the defendant’s home law, a
federal court should too—or at least, it should not decline to do so on
choice-of-law grounds.222
What happens when a state court bootstraps? In the absence of CAFA,
it is not clear what a federal court should do. On the one hand, for a federal
court to bootstrap on its own initiative seems wrong, as Larry Kramer has
argued.223 Federal procedural rules are not supposed to change the parties’
substantive rights, and changing rules of priority because a case is filed as a
class action seems to do just that. On the other hand, if a federal court
bootstraps because the state court would, it is state law and not federal
procedure that is changing the substantive rights. So the federal prohibition
against modifying substantive rights would not stand as a barrier.
But perhaps there is another obstacle. When a state court bootstraps,
state procedural law is modifying the parties’ substantive rights. The state
rule for certification, the analog of Federal Rule 23, is being understood, at
least implicitly, to authorize the court to depart from the choice-of-law
analysis it would use if the claims were presented individually—to give
priority to claims under the defendant’s home law. But the Rules Enabling
Act tells a federal court following Federal Rule 23 not to do this—not to
alter the parties’ substantive rights for procedural reasons such as the
existence of a class action.224 So already there is a real tension between
Klaxon and the Enabling Act.
Bring CAFA into the picture, and the matter becomes clearer.
Congress was plainly concerned that state courts were certifying too many
class actions, and it plainly was hoping that fewer would be certified in
federal court.225 This is perhaps best understood as a limited repeal of policy
Erie: in some cases, Congress appears to be saying, there is a good enough
reason for federal courts to reach different results than state courts. What
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Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(4)(B)–(C), 119 Stat. 4, 5 (codified
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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One could, of course, respond that CAFA’s drafters plainly hoped to take advantage of federal
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disingenuous. See Burbank, supra note 200. But that attempt to change results through judicial
predilection rather than statutory direction is deeply contrary to the spirit of Erie, see Marcus, supra note
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See Kramer, supra note 123, at 549.
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See supra text accompanying notes 220–21.
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kind of cases? The text of the statute identifies some problems that do not
really exist in state court practice, but we can infer an antipathy to changing
choice-of-law analysis in order to facilitate certification. Given the doubt
about whether a federal court should follow a bootstrapping state court at
all, CAFA is a good enough reason to go the other way.226
Here the two-step model shows us the best form of the argument for
certification under the defendant’s home law: that this law creates a cause
of action for the plaintiffs, who can, if they wish, waive more generous
remedies offered by their own states’ laws, or that the defendant’s home
law should prevail in a conflict with more defendant-friendly laws from the
plaintiffs’ home states. It also shows us what it would mean for a federal
court to depart from state choice-of-law analysis: the federal court would be
making a different decision as to the relative priority to be given to the
defendant’s and plaintiffs’ home laws. Last, it explains when this departure
would be appropriate: when the state court would certify the class only
because it has engaged in bootstrapping.
E. Shady Grove v. Allstate
The Supreme Court’s most recent venture into the Erie arena concerns
not CAFA’s fear of permissive certification practice in state courts, but
actually the reverse: a claim that could not be heard as a class action in a
state court but could—the Court concluded—in federal court.227 Shady
Grove Orthopedic Associates sued Allstate Insurance in federal court for
failing to pay an insurance claim on time.228 In such cases, New York
insurance law entitles insured parties to statutory interest of two percent
monthly.229 Shady Grove alleged that untimely payments were Allstate’s
practice and sought certification of a class of all persons to whom Allstate
owed interest.230
New York Civil Practice Law section 901(b) provides that an action to
recover statutory damages “may not be maintained as a class action.”231 The
question in Shady Grove was whether this New York rule prevented
certification in federal court, or whether it should be deemed supplanted by
the requirements of Federal Rule 23(b).232
226

See Nagareda, supra note 205, at 683–85.
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (2010)
(plurality opinion). For another attempt to analyze this case from a choice-of-law perspective, see Joseph
P. Bauer, Shedding Light on Shady Grove: Further Reflections on the Erie Doctrine from a Conflicts
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Id. at 1436–37.
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Id. at 1436 n.1 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney
2006)).
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Id. at 1437–38.
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The Court fragmented badly on that issue. Justice Scalia, joined by
Justices Roberts, Thomas, and Sotomayor, found a “direct collision”
between Rule 23 and section 901(b) and argued that in such case, the
Federal Rule should prevail unless it was invalid under the Rules Enabling
Act—a question to be determined by looking only at the Rule and asking
whether it regulated procedure.233 This four-Justice plurality found the Rule
valid under that test and held that it preempted section 901(b): the class
could be certified.234
Justice Ginsburg, writing for herself and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and
Alito in dissent, wanted to give independent significance to the Rules
Enabling Act’s prohibition on the modification of substantive rights.
Relying on choice-of-law theory, she would have adopted a moderate
interpretation of Rule 23 and held that the class could not be certified to the
extent that it sought statutory damages.235
Justice Stevens, writing alone in concurrence, agreed with Justice
Ginsburg that the Enabling Act’s “shall not abridge” language should be
given independent force.236 But because he thought the New York law did
not deal with substantive rights, he agreed with Justice Scalia’s disposition
of the case and provided a fifth vote for certification.237
Shady Grove is a hard case to read in terms of its precedential
significance. Justice Stevens joined the part of Scalia’s opinion finding a
direct conflict between Rule 23 and section 901(b), but he also seemed to
disavow that part’s claim that a Rule’s validity is an all-or-nothing affair.238
Justice Ginsburg, for her part, argued in a footnote that “a majority of this
Court . . . agrees that Federal Rules should be read with moderation in
diversity suits to accommodate important state concerns.”239 How the Court
will read the Enabling Act in the future seems an open question, especially
given the replacement of Justice Stevens by Justice Kagan.
Analytically, however, the case is actually relatively easy. The Justices
split 5–4 over whether to give independent significance to the Rules
Enabling Act’s “shall not abridge” language, with five agreeing that they
should240: if section 901(b) was about the scope of substantive rights, Rule
23 would be forced to accommodate it. On the question of whether
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section 901(b) was substantive, however, Justice Stevens split from the four
dissenters, giving Justice Scalia a fifth vote for the disposition.241
But even the 5–4 split over the Rules Enabling Act probably amounts
to less than it seems in terms of underlying principles. We may see this by
considering two different statutes that the New York legislature might have
written. First, they could have written an unambiguously substantive one.
Into each statute providing for statutory damages, they could have added a
section providing, “Because these damages exist to provide an incentive for
individual suits, they shall not be available to any plaintiff proceeding via a
class action.” Certainly the four dissenters and Justice Stevens would not
have found a conflict between this statute and Rule 23, and most likely the
four-Justice plurality would not have found a conflict either.242 Rule 23 does
not purport to create remedies independent of those available under state
law, and it is unlikely that either the Rules Enabling Act or the Constitution
would allow it to do so. Shady Grove’s class action might proceed, but it
would be limited to actual damages and hence would likely not meet
CAFA’s amount-in-controversy requirement.
On the other hand, the legislature might have written an
unambiguously procedural statute, a general provision stating, “Because
class actions are burdensome for courts, no class action seeking statutory
damages may be maintained in the courts of this state.” Here again there
would clearly be no conflict between Rule 23 and the state law, though the
result would be that the class action seeking statutory damages would be
allowed in federal court.
Which of these statutes was the legislature trying to write? Or did it
have both a procedural and a substantive purpose in mind? How to construe
this particular statute is not the main focus of this Article, though I think
that Justice Ginsburg has the better of the argument. It is easy to see why
the legislature might have wanted to exclude statutory damages from class
actions: the effect of multiplying those damages across the class could
produce annihilative liability. It is much harder to see why they might have
wanted to allow such damages but exclude the actions from New York
courts: there is nothing procedurally objectionable about them.
My main point is that thinking about these possibilities in terms of the
two-step model brings more analytical clarity. Regardless of which statute
the New York legislature intended to write, the case, like Erie itself,
presents a false conflict: a situation where the relevant issue falls within the
lawmaking power of only one sovereign. If the statute limits the recovery
available to class action plaintiffs, then it is about the definition of rights
under New York law, something within the sole authority of New York.243
241
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If it is about requirements for class certification, then New York law
controls in New York courts and Rule 23 controls in federal courts. No
Justice disagreed with these propositions. Shady Grove is important because
the way the Court interprets ambiguous state statutes will affect
outcomes—and as Justice Ginsburg explains, Scalia’s rather wooden
textualism does not make much sense when trying to determine how a
statute should operate in contexts the lawmakers did not contemplate.244 But
once a method of interpretation is chosen, the analysis is straightforward.
CONCLUSION
I have tried elsewhere to demonstrate that thinking about choice-of-law
problems from the perspective of the two-step model renders them much
easier to resolve.245 Here I have argued the same thing about a variety of
Erie problems. Because Erie is, I believe, fundamentally a choice-of-law
case, that result should not be surprising. That the two-step model works so
well here should buttress the case that Erie is best understood as a choiceof-law case. It should also enhance the appeal of the model itself. That is
my ultimate aim—to demonstrate that this way of thinking about the
general problem is superior to the approach that takes choice of law to be
some sort of metaprocedure divorced from substantive law.

533–34 (1949) (“We cannot give [the cause of action] longer life in the federal court than it would have
had in the state court without adding something to the cause of action. We may not do that consistently
with Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.”).
244
See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1469–70 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
245
See, e.g., Roosevelt, Renvoi, supra note 6; Roosevelt, Myth, supra note 6 .
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